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In the wake of the COVID-19 stock market crash, the debate over ESG’s ability to preserve 
shareholder value through turbulent times has received increasing attention. In this thesis we 
analyze the effect of ESG on stock market performance during the COVID-19 Nordic stock 
market, and whether ESG acted as a resilience factor. We test 188 listed Nordic firms during 
the crisis from February 19 to March 23 and the rebound period from March 23 to June 5. In 
our first model, a cross-sectional model with Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns, we find a 
neutral relationship between ESG and stock market performance during the crisis, but a 
negative relationship during the rebound, which we believe can be explained by market 
sentiment. A second model, a panel data model with fixed effects, confirms these results and 
finds a differential effect of ESG when comparing the rebound to ordinary times. Amongst the 
three ESG dimensions, our findings indicate that the Environmental dimension played a main 
role in the negative effect during the rebound. Our results are robust to multiple tests, but the 
results are limited to ESG-scored, Nordic firms. Further, we identify potential issues of 
sampling bias for ESG-rated firms, which should be further explored in future research. 
Keywords: Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG), Sustainability, COVID-19, Nordic 
Market.   
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The focus on sustainability in finance has experienced increased attention in recent years, and 
one of the most common ways of referring to sustainability is through the ESG factors. ESG 
stands for environmental, social and governance and is used as a key factor in measuring 
companies' sustainability. There has been unprecedented growth in ESG investments in recent 
years, a trend that is likely to continue (UN Principles for Responsible Investments, 2020). 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between ESG and stock market 
performance, and the main conclusion that can be drawn from these studies is a neutral effect 
between ESG integration and stock market performance. 
The outbreak of COVID-19 cases led to an unexpectedly rapid decline in the global stock 
markets, known as the 2020 Market Crash. In the wake of the market crash, there have been 
widespread claims that the ESG factors act as a downside risk protector for companies’ stock 
market performance. However, when it comes to ESG and the crisis perspective, the literature 
is limited and divided. Some studies find a positive effect of ESG through crises, while other 
studies cannot prove such a connection.  
In this thesis, we have chosen to focus on the Nordic countries, which are considered to have 
a leading position in ESG integration. Indications that the effect of ESG in crises may be 
geographically different, as well as the lack of research on the effect in the Nordic region, are 
motivations for this scope. As far as we know, no one has investigated whether ESG 
dimensions have significance for Nordic companies through crises.  
Based on a thorough literature review, our impression is that Demers et al. (2020) and Lins et 
al. (2017) have done the most robust research on ESG during crises. These studies will 
consequently inspire our methodological approach. We use ESG scores as a proxy for ESG, 
and Reuters Refinitiv ESG score is our main score, as it has the best coverage among available 
scores, while Sustainalytics acts as a secondary score for robustness. We define the COVID-
19 stock market as the period from February 19 to June 5, 2020, consisting of the market crash 
lasting from February 19 to March 23, and the rebound period lasting from March 23 to June 
5. 
Our primary model is an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression, using Buy-and-hold 




ESG scores as our variable of interest. BHAR is commonly used to calculate abnormal returns 
and is in line with other studies examining the effect of ESG during market crises. Our sample 
consists of 188 firms for which Refinitiv ESG scores and all other data are available, and 
amongst these, 72 firms also have Sustainalytics ESG scores. We control for market- and 
accounting-based variables, as well as industry- and country-specific effects. Betas, 
idiosyncratic risk, momentum, and Fama-French factor loadings are estimated using rolling 
regressions. 
We test both aggregated (ESG) and disaggregated ESG scores (E, S and G) for both providers 
of ESG scores. Next, we check if the effect varies between quartiles of ESG score and between 
countries, and test different time windows for the rebound period. In addition, we roughly 
explore stock market performance differences between firms with and without ESG scores. 
Our secondary model uses panel data dating back to 2015, and the samples include 171 firms 
with Reuters Refinitiv ESG scores and 74 firms with Sustainalytics ESG scores. The 
dependent variable is monthly abnormal return, and we control for the same factors as the 
main model. 
The number of independent variables is high relative to the sample size, and there might be a 
risk of overfitting and multicollinearity. We take several methodological measures to handle 
this, such as statistical tests and special types of robust standard errors.  
We find no significant effect of ESG scores on stock performance during the COVID-19 stock 
market crash, and the results are robust in all models. Although during the rebound period, we 
find that the Reuters Refinitiv ESG score has a significant negative effect on stock 
performance, especially during the first 5 weeks of the rebound. The panel data model 
confirms this and finds that the ESG effect differs negatively when comparing the rebound to 
ordinary times. Our results indicate that, amongst E, S and G, the Environmental dimension 
played a leading role in the negative relationship with stock market performance. In addition, 
we show that the negative effect was more severe for the firms with ESG scores in the upper 
two quartiles. The results from the sample of Sustainalytics-rated firms indicate a neutral 
relationship for the rebound period, which we believe is due to sample differences. Our results 
are limited to Nordic firms with ESG score coverage and available accounting data. We also 
find that ESG-rated firms performed better than non-rated firms during the rebound, as well 
as indications that the rating agencies’ selection process is not random, which raises the issue 
of a sampling bias. 
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The structure of the thesis is as follows: Section 2 presents the background and motivation for 
our thesis, before relevant literature and theory are reviewed in sections 3 and 4. Thereafter, 
section 5 presents our data, and the methodology is described in section 6. The results are 






This section will present the relevance of our topic; ESG and stock market performance during 
the COVID-19 crisis, and the motivation behind it, before further connecting the topic to the 
Nordic market.  
2.1 ESG 
In finance, sustainability is most often referred to as “Socially Responsible Investing” (SRI), 
Sustainable Investing, Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), and more recently through the 
factors “Environmental, Social and Governance” (ESG). The definitions have some specific 
differences, but they all have their core around the ESG factors, intending to improve 
companies and portfolios along these dimensions for all stakeholders (De Spiegeleer et al., 
2020). In 2004, the CEOs of major financial institutions participated in the UN Global Impact 
initiative, with the IFC and the Swiss government's support, to find a way to integrate the ESG-
dimension into capital markets. As a result of the initiative, the term ESG was coined in 2005 
in the study “Who cares wins” (Kell, 2018). ESG-factors cover topics such as climate change, 
pollution, working conditions, human rights and corruption (UN Principles of Responsible 
Investing, 2020).  
  
The practice of ESG investing in modern times can be dated back to the 1960s as Socially 
Responsible Investing, which excluded investing in companies or entire industries based on 
business activities, such as tobacco or involvement in apartheid (MSCI, n.d.). As the financial 
industry grew, activists found opportunities to influence corporate behavior. In the 1980s, the 
Exxon Valdez oil spill and the Bhopal disaster created increased involvement around 
environmental concerns, while people became more aware of the threats from climate change. 
The financial crisis in 2008-2009 was a strong reminder of the interaction between society, 
the economy and financial markets (Schroders, 2016). Banks and financial institutions were 
blamed for being too greedy and lacking governance, and in the wake of the crisis, 
governments and the public voiced that the financial markets should change their policies. 
There was a desire to allocate capital towards the efficient solution of social and environmental 
challenges, as well as the overseeing of activities through increased governance (Sampei, 
2018). According to Kell (2018), growth in ESG investments accelerated in 2013-2014 when 
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the first studies were published showing a positive correlation between corporate sustainability 
performance and financial results. 
  
Today, the ESG factors are the foundation of the UN Principles for Responsible 
Investment.  As of March 31, 2020, more than 2700 investors, with US$103.4 trillion assets 
under management, have signed up to follow these principles (UN Principles for Responsible 
Investments, 2020). In Figure 1 we illustrate how assets under management have increased 
sharply since 2006. As of November 2020, there have been quadruple inflows into ESG funds 
compared to 2019 (Tew, 2020). According to McKinsey's Global Survey from 2019, the 
majority of professional investors and executives believe that ESG policies increase 
shareholder value (McKinsey & Company, 2020).  
 
 
Figure 1 – The collective assets under management based on active signatories by 
Principles for Responsible Investment from 2006 to 2020. 
 
 
2.2 COVID-19 Market Crash 
On January 30, 2020, the World Health Organization (WHO, 2020) declared the outbreak of 
COVID-19 a global public health emergency as more than 7.000 cases were reported 
worldwide. The COVID-19 cases then began spreading at an increasing rate, and by March 
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to a lockdown of society in large parts of the world, and by April 2020, about half of the 
world's population was in lockdown (Sandford, 2020). The outbreak of COVID-19 cases led 
to a rapid decline in the global stock markets, known as the 2020 Market Crash. This also 
occurred when share values were at or above previous peaks. The MSCI World Index peaked 
on February 12 at 2,434.50 points, and bottomed on March 23 at 1,596.00 points, a drop of 
34.4%, as shown in figure 2. No previous outbreak of diseases, including the Spanish flu, has 
impacted the stock markets as severely as the COVID-19 pandemic (Baker et al., 2020). The 
International Monetary Fund refers to the great lockdown as the worst economic downturn 
since the great depression (Gopinath, 2020). The market crash was also the fastest fall in global 
stock markets in financial history (Li, 2020).  
However, the fall was short-lived and after just a few months, the market was almost fully 
recovered. The SEB Group (2020) points to several reasons behind the steep market climb in 
late March 2020. The COVID-19 infection curves began to flatten with the focus shifting from 
lockdown to reopening. Further, the unique stimuli packages also allowed the investors to 
assume that companies’ temporary income loss would be replaced by income growth within a 
reasonable period. As of August 2020, S&P500 reached a new all-time high, known as the 
“fastest recovery ever” (Jasinski, 2020).  
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2.3 Downside Risk 
In the wake of the market crash, there have been several claims that the involvement in ESG 
dimensions has acted as a protection in the COVID-19 market, and that companies with high 
ESG involvement have performed better than peers with less ESG involvement. As early as 
April 2020, the importance of ESG during the COVID-19 crisis was highlighted. Morningstar 
coined ESG an equity vaccine, stating that ESG holdings seem to have held up better than the 
rest (Willis, 2020). According to Financial Times, “ESG funds continue to outperform wider 
markets” (Darbyshire, 2020). In Fortune, Polman (2020) states that companies that care about 
all their stakeholders, not just shareholders, and strive for something bigger than profit, may 
be better equipped for the COVID-19 crisis and explains why ESG funds outperform their 
lesser ESG performing peers. There are many similar articles, and these are just examples of 
the widespread hype ESG has gained through the COVID-19 crisis. 
2.4 The Nordic Countries 
Our thesis is geographically limited to the Nordic market, which stands out as a unique market 
in light of ESG engagement. Morningstar recently crowned the Nordic countries as ESG 
leaders, with Finland and Sweden respectively ranked number two and three in the world 
(Basseli, 2020). In the Sustainable Competitiveness Index 2019, all the Nordic countries are 
covered in the top 6 ranking (Solability, 2020). Nordic institutional investors have long 
recognized the ESG factors as key drivers of value (Nasdaq, n.d.a). Further, ESG is an integral 
part of the investment process, and no other region has implemented the normative focus to 
the same degree as in the Nordic region (Boyd, 2019). Nordic companies have a relatively flat 
structure, score highly on human orientation, focuses on social values, and are highly future-
oriented. These cultural dimensions have a high impact on a firm's sustainability score (Preuss, 
2017).  In addition, the Nordic region is ranked among the most highly performing global 
green bond issuers, according to international indices for sustainable performance (Climate 
Bond Initiative, 2018). Although, despite the Nordic region's leading position, research on 
ESG in the Nordic region is limited.  
 
During the first quarter of 2020, the Nordic countries followed the movements of global 
indices and experienced a significant decline in their stock exchange markets. The OMXN40 




Nordic exchanges, revised twice a year (Nasdaq, n.d.b). Similar to the MSCI World index, the 
OMXN40 quickly recovered after only a few months. DNB Assets Management has examined 
how a group of ESG leading companies in the Nordic countries has performed during the 
COVID-19 crisis. In their fund “DNB Grønt Norden” which focuses on ESG-dimensions in 
the Nordic countries, most of their ESG-leading companies have performed better than the 
benchmark during the period (Lode, 2020).  
 
Based on the Nordic region's leading position within ESG and on the COVID-19 crisis which 
created shock waves on the stock exchanges, we find it very interesting to examine if the 
proposed “ESG downside-immunity” applies to the Nordic region. According to a case study 
by Scholtens and Sievänen (2013), the ESG-performance is highly correlated in the Nordic 
countries because of great similarities. We find it reasonable to examine the Nordic countries 
as a whole, because of the countries' similarities and to ensure sufficient data. Our perception 
is that there is little research on the relationship between ESG and stock market performance 
in the Nordic region. To the best of our knowledge, no one has examined Nordic ESG firms' 
stock market performance in light of the COVID-19 crisis. We believe this paper can be 
informative for investors in the Nordic market. 
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3. Literature Review 
This section will cover previous research related to ESG and stock market performance1. Most 
of the studies we highlight address how ESG stocks and ESG funds perform during times of 
crisis. The crisis periods covered will mainly be the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and studies 
that have already investigated the COVID-19 crisis. Finally, we will link the previous literature 
to this thesis and our contribution to the literature.   
3.1 ESG and Stock Market Performance 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between ESG and stock market 
performance. Revelli and Viviani (2015) conducted a meta-analysis in which they examined 
85 previous studies and 190 experiments over a period of 20 years. According to their study, 
no conclusion can be drawn at the global level whether there is a positive or negative 
correlation between Socially Responsible Investing (SRI) and stock market performance. In 
addition, Friede et al. (2015) have investigated approximately 2,200 unique studies that 
examine the connection between ESG and financial performance. They conclude that the vast 
majority of the studies show a positive or insignificant connection, but that there are large 
geographical differences. In Europe, the most relevant region for our thesis, 26.1% of the 
studies showed a positive relation, while 65.9% showed an insignificant relation. In a study 
based on global data from recent times, Sargis and Wang (2020) find no connection between 
ESG and returns. In sum, the literature indicates that ESG investments have not given any 
positive or negative abnormal returns in recent years. Giese et al. (2019) point out that 
variations in findings between different studies may be due to different methods and 
differences in databases. The authors also criticize previous research for its inability to identify 
economic mechanisms to explain the connection between ESG and corporate financial 
performance.  
 
1 In the literature review, we refer to the original terms used in the studies, i.e., CSR, CSP and SRI. Nevertheless, throughout 




3.2 ESG and Resilience 
Literature within SRI has shown that investors with preferences for sustainability are less 
sensitive to SRI fund performance compared to conventional fund performance (Bollen, 2007; 
Renneboog et al., 2011). If investors' attitude toward risk is affected by COVID-19 and many 
investors are selling their positions, the SRI literature on a general basis indicates that ESG 
investors are more resilient than other investors. Sassen et al. (2016) demonstrate that a higher 
Corporate Social Performance (CSP) decreases total and idiosyncratic risk on firms in Europe. 
Hoepner et al. (2016) provide evidence supporting that engagement on ESG issues can benefit 
shareholders by reducing firms’ downside risk and specifically highlight engagement in the 
environmental dimension as the most effective. Albuquerque et al. (2019) model CSR as an 
investment to increase product differentiation, allowing firms to benefit from higher profits. 
Due to differentiation, the authors argue that CSR decreases systematic risk, raises profits, and 
has the greatest impact on firms with high product differentiation.  
 
Lys et al. (2015) show that CSR investments provide insufficient returns. The authors conclude 
that CSR investments signal stronger future performance, but do not find that those 
investments have positive returns or create value for the typical business. The study does not 
explicitly address the crisis perspective, but, as discussed by Demers et al. (2020), the CSR-
related signals of future performance will change in the event of a crisis. Accordingly, in 
difficult times, ESG investments can be considered wasted, as they do not help to handle the 
crisis itself. Based on this view, companies with high ESG investments may be more affected 
by a crisis. 
3.3 ESG and the Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 
In contrast to ESG and stock market performance in general, research on the specific role of 
ESG during times of crisis is limited. Some studies have examined ESG-investments during 
the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and demonstrate that ESG-investing acts as a downside risk 
protector. Such as the study by Lins et al. (2017) which has examined U.S. Stocks during the 
financial crisis. The authors find that companies with a high social capital score, measured by 
the CSR intensity, had higher returns compared to companies with lower social capital scores. 
They conclude that companies investing in CSR activities create trust between their 
stakeholders and shareholders, which pays off when trust in markets and corporations is 
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weakened. A similar study by Bouslah et al. (2018) shows that the relationship between risk 
and social performance is significantly different in the crisis period compared to the pre-crisis 
period, and the authors conclude that CSR forces act as risk mitigation measures during market 
turmoil. Nofsinger and Varma (2014) compare returns between SRI funds and conventional 
funds in the US during the period from 2000 until 2011. They show that SRI funds outperform 
their conventional peers during crises, while SRI funds underperform during non-crisis. A 
study by Leite and Cortez (2015) does not find any positive effect of ESG through the financial 
crisis. The authors examined French SRI funds investing in Europe during the crisis and non-
crisis periods that occurred from January 2001 to December 2012. Their findings are that SRI 
funds significantly underperform through non-crisis and do not offer any protection through a 
crisis but instead match similar conventional funds.  
 
Albuquerque et al. (2020) find the COVID-19 crisis very different from the global financial 
crisis of 2008-2009, both in terms of cause and duration. In the financial crisis, with a duration 
of two years, companies had plenty of time to adapt to the crisis and new government policies, 
making it challenging to observe the effect of ESG on stock market performance. Compared 
to the financial crisis, the COVID-19 crisis has been an unpredictable health crisis that has hit 
the economy as an exogenous shock, and the duration of the resulting stock market crisis was 
also far shorter. Dai et al. (2020) show evidence that companies tend to increase their ESG 
score in times of economic-political uncertainty. Due to this confounding effect between ESG 
policies and trust during the financial crisis, Albuquerque et al. (2020) argue that there may be 
a limitation to whether companies with high sustainability scores in 2007-2008 and their good 
performance can be linked to ESG policies and trust in general.  
  
Despite different causes for the financial crisis of 2008-2009 and the COVID-19 crisis, they 
both triggered magnitude stock price movements. Takahashi and Yamada (2020) further point 
to similarities in both crises, such as high debt in the social sector, fire sales by the financial 
institutions, and trade shrinkage. Arguably, research from the financial crisis may have some 
transferability to the COVID-19 crisis.  
3.4 ESG and the COVID-19 Stock Market Crash 
Some studies have already addressed the relationship between ESG and stock market 




al. (2020) investigated corporate characteristics and stock returns’ reaction to the COVID-19 
market crash. The study is based on more than 6,700 stocks from 61 different economies. One 
of their main findings is that companies with more CSR activities experience a milder drop in 
stock returns. The authors argue that this finding is consistent with the view that CSR activities 
strengthen the relationship between the company and its stakeholders. In this way, CSR 
strengthens loyalty and bonds among key stakeholders enabling the firm to work with those 
stakeholders in responding to the pandemic effectively. Although the stock market 
performance of the Nordic countries is not explicitly stated in the study, the authors state that 
the CSR effect is greatest in societies that value these values the most, i.e., economies that 
value fair treatment of people and that are concerned with the reduction of climate change. 
Based on the World Values Survey (2020), the Nordic countries score highly on 
Environmental Priority and Human rights. This may indicate a positive effect on ESG in the 
Nordic region, when applying the arguments of Ding et al. (2020). Another study that finds a 
positive relationship between ESG and returns is Albuquerque et al. (2020), which has 
conducted an analysis of the COVID-19 market crash based on ESG data from more than 
2,000 distinct US stocks. The authors conclude that stocks with higher ES ratings have 
significantly higher returns and lower return volatility during the first quarter of 2020.  
  
Takahashi and Yamada (2020) have examined the Japanese stock market during COVID-19 
and find no evidence that ESG is associated with abnormal returns during the pandemic. They 
point out that the ESG may have a different meaning in Europe and the United States, where 
the ESG-concept was developed, compared to Asia. Takahashi and Yamada (2020) also 
mention that the sample size used in their ESG-analysis is just a small fraction of their total 
sample and there may be some biases in this regard. However, the study sheds light on the 
impact of ESG and supports the possibility of geographical differences. 
 
Demers et al. (2020) show evidence that ESG-companies in the US do not offer any positive 
explanatory power for returns during COVID-192. They demonstrate that ESG is not 
significant in the crisis period of the first quarter of 2020, while ESG is negatively associated 
with return in the second quarter of 2020, which they define as the market recovery period.  
 
2 Demers et al. (2020) study was not published during the beginning of our writing process. The edition we are inspired by is 
the first draft published in August 2020.  
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Compared to similar studies, Demers et al. (2020) apply more control variables known to be 
theoretically or empirically correlated with returns and ESG. They find that financial 
flexibility was essential to a firm’s performance during the crisis period, which is consistent 
with a long line of economic research. The authors also point out that investments in internally 
generated intangible assets were highly significant in the explanation of abnormal returns for 
both periods. In addition, the authors replicate the findings of Albuquerque et al. (2020), which 
they find suffers from omitted variables bias, and they find the same weakness in Ding et al.’s 
(2020) study. Demers et al. (2020) claim that in the American market, there is a lot of talk and 
little execution of corporate social responsibility, which is different from Europe, where ESG 
is taken more seriously. Demers et al. (2020) only examine U.S stocks, while Ding et al. (2020) 
examine a global sample that mainly contains non-US stocks. Demers et al. (2020) argue that 
Ding et al. (2020)'s study is not directly generalizing for US stocks, while their own study is 
generalizable to a U.S.-only setting. Once again, the literature reiterates that there may be 
geographical differences associated with the effect of ESG, which makes the Nordic stock 
market interesting to explore. 
3.5 Known Explanatory Variables of Stock Market 
Performance During Crises 
Several studies have examined the attributes, apart from ESG, that characterize resilience 
during crises. In the studies of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) and Bhattacharya et al. (2010), 
financial flexibility such as profit, liquidity and low borrowing have been important for firms' 
resilience during crises. According to Kahle and Stultz (2013), companies with weaker balance 
sheets before the financial crisis were more affected during the crisis.  
 
Among studies from the COVID-19 crisis, Jagannathan and Zhang (2020) find superior 
performance for high-quality firms relative to peers during stressful times, where high-quality 
firms are measured by conventional historical financial statement-based measures as well as 
default probability measures. Acharya and Steffen (2020) show that companies with access to 
liquidity perform better during the first quarter. Fahlenbrach et al. (2020) present evidence that 
non-financial firms with higher cash holdings and lower financial leverage are less affected 
by stock price resilience. Ramelli and Wagner (2020) find strong causal evidence for the effect 
of international trade and global value chains on corporate value, where more internationally 




exposed to regions where the COVID-19 pandemic is less constrained, performed worse. 
Firms that are more resilient to social distancing perform better during the pandemic, 
according to Pagano et al. (2020).  
3.6 Connecting Previous Studies to the Thesis 
From the literature presented in this section, no common global conclusion can be drawn about 
the effect of ESG on stock market return during crises, which suggests that local differences 
will occur. During ordinary times, the literature seems to be fairly consistent, where ESG does 
not contribute to any better or worse excess returns, while on the topic of ESG during crisis, 
the literature is to a greater extent limited and divided. Our impression is that Lins et al. (2017) 
and Demers et al. (2020) have done the most robust research on ESG during crises, and we 
agree with Demers et al.’s (2020) criticism of omitted variable bias in Albuquerque et al.’s 
(2020) and Ding et al.’s (2020) studies. Demers et al. (2020) state clearly that their results only 
apply to the United States, and the effect may be different elsewhere. The literature therefore 
motivates to test the effect of ESG on stock performance during crises in other regions. As far 
as we know, no one has examined the ESG performance against the COVID-19 crisis in the 
Nordic region. We use Lins et al. (2017) and Demers et al. (2020) as inspiration for our 
methodology because we regard these papers as the most thorough and robust research on the 
relationship between ESG and stock performance during a crisis. Due to the divided literature, 
geographical differences and lacking research on the Nordic market, it is difficult to form a 
hypothesis for our thesis. Although, we find it reasonable to expect a non-positive effect, 
similarly to Demers et al. (2020), because of their robust evidence from the COVID-19 stock 
market and the methodological similarities between our thesis and their study. 
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4. Theory 
The following section will discuss several relevant economic theories that will help elucidate 
the relationship between ESG and stock market performance. Further, we will present 
multifactor models from the financial theory to explain stock returns.  
4.1 Shareholder and Stakeholder Theory 
An investment in activities that promote ESG score, and the disclosure of ESG-related 
information, undeniably demands a part of the firms’ resources. Accordingly, we assume that 
an increase in ESG score comes at an economic cost to the firm. The shareholder theory 
presented by the economist Milton Friedman (1962), states that firms’ sole responsibility is to 
maximize shareholder value. Friedman argues that shareholders are the only group a firm is 
socially responsible for. Therefore, the choice of participation in social initiatives should be 
made by the shareholders themselves, rather than managers on the shareholders' behalf. 
Friedman further argues that considering several stakeholders with different interests is time-
consuming and value-destroying. According to the theory, a firm should only invest in ESG if 
it is the most profitable option. Opponents have criticized the theory for encouraging short-
term management and condone unethical behavior. (Danielson et al., 2008). 
  
Stakeholder theory was first presented in 1984 by R. Edward Freeman in response to 
Friedman's Shareholder theory. According to Freeman and Philips (2002), a firm must 
consider all its stakeholders for maximizing shareholder value over time. A firm’s success 
depends on the strength of the relationship between management and the firm’s stakeholders. 
In addition to shareholders, stakeholders include customers, employees, suppliers, authorities, 
and others affected by the firm's business. ESG activities may strengthen the bonds between 
the firm and stakeholders, and this way stakeholders are more willing to be loyal and support 
the firm in times of duress. Critics of the shareholder theory believe that it provides little 
guidance on balancing the often-competing interests of different stakeholder groups 
(Marcoux, 2000; Jensen, 2002). The stakeholder theory may also encourage managers to focus 
on the short-term to the detriment of long-term corporate health, unless the interest of long-




4.1.1 Risk management theory 
The risk management theory (a risk management argument based on the stakeholder theory) 
postulates that companies will experience "insurance" -like protection against firm-specific 
risk by being involved in CSR activities (Godfrey et al., 2009). Certain types of CSR activities 
may produce moral capital or goodwill for various stakeholder groups. When a firm is 
adversely affected in the event of a crisis, the moral capital tempers punitive penalties by 
stakeholders (Godfrey, 2005), e.g., customers’ loyalty and investors’ trust will suffer to a 
lesser extent. Godfrey et al. (2009) imply that moral capital may have little to do with value-
creating but plays a major role in protecting economic value.  
4.2 Other Theories 
4.2.1 Agency theory 
The decision to invest in ESG ultimately happens at the discretion of management. In this 
context, another view of corporate ESG investments can be deduced from Agency Theory 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The theory is based on the principal-agent problem, which arises 
when the agent (managers) makes decisions on behalf of the principal (shareholders) when 
they have conflicts of interest and asymmetric information. Management's motivation for 
increasing the company's ESG score may be to improve their personal reputation, for 
example, by appearing more environmentally friendly, at a cost that shareholders must pay 
for. According to Surroca and Tribó (2008), increased personal reputation through CSP 
investments could be a part of management's anchoring strategy to reduce the likelihood of 
replacement, which in turn has particularly negative effects on financial performance. Based 
on this view, ESG investments will be wasted and most likely hurt the company. Such 
investments could indicate poor leadership and make companies less resilient during crises.  
4.2.2 Prospect theory 
In 1979, Nobel laureate in economics Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky developed the 
Prospect Theory. The theory states an asymmetric relationship between gain and loss, where 
the pain of loss is greater than the joy of gain of the corresponding amount. The theory 
challenges the classical economic theories that have a mathematical approach to expected 
utility. Through the study by Kahneman and Tversky, people tend to prefer choices that are 
safe and being risk-averse. According to Barbéris and Brière (2020), ESG might be 
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considered a safe haven for the sole reason that investors anticipated that others would 
consider it the same. This attitude can be linked to the prospect theory, where investors view 
ESG mainly as a downside risk protector rather than an investment in high returns.  
4.3 Factor Models 
4.3.1 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) 
The CAPM describes a linear relationship between systematic risk and expected return for 
an asset, and it is founded on the fact that an investor must be compensated for the time 
value of money and the asset's exposure to the market. The model is based on the work by 
Markowitz (1952) and was introduced independently by Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and 
Mossin (1966). The CAPM is presented in equation 1. 
 
!"#!,#$ = #$,# +	(%"#&',# − #$,#$ (1) 
 
where: 
!"#!,#$ = expected return of the investment. 
#$,#  = risk-free rate 
(%  = beta of the investment. The slope coefficient, measuring the sensitivity of the asset to 
the market. 
#&',# − #$,#	= market risk premium. 
4.3.2 Fama-French three-factor model: 
Fama and French (1993) expanded the CAPM model with two more factors, as presented in 
equation 2, which historically explain more of the variation that the error term in CAPM would 
have captured. The model was considered as a major advance from CAPM, as it explained 
around 90 % of the variation in a diversified portfolio, compared to 70% for the CAPM.  
 








-./!  = Small Minus Big: The factor is a value premium that reflects that smaller companies 
tend to outperform larger ones over the long term. The SMB factor is measured by taking the 
companies' average return with the 50% lowest market value, subtracting the average return 
of the other half with the highest market value. The factor is a monthly premium in a zero-
investment portfolio long in small-cap stocks and short in big-cap stocks. 
  
0.1!  = High Minus Low: The factor is another value premium that reflects that companies 
with higher book-to-market value (value companies) tend to outperform those with lower 
book-to-market value (growth companies) over the long term. The HML factor is measured 
by taking the average of the companies with the highest book to market value (above 70th 
percentile), subtracting the average of those companies with the lowest book to market value 
(below 30th percentile). The HML factor is a monthly premium in a zero-investment portfolio 
long in high book-to-market firms and short in low book-to-market firms.  
  
4.3.3 Carhart four-factor model 
Carhart (1997) detected that returns correlated with prior returns, and they added a momentum 
factor to the Fama-French three-factor model, to improve the explanation of return variance. 
The model is presented in equation 3. 
 




3.1! = Winners minus losers. The third value premium factor reflects the momentum effect, 
where stocks that have performed well over the past 12 months tend to rise further. The 
opposite applies to shares that have performed poorly in the last 12 months. The factor is 
calculated by subtracting the average return of the 50% lowest-performing stocks (losers) from 
the average return of the other half of the highest performing stocks (winners). The factor is a 
monthly premium, lagged one month, in a zero-cost portfolio long in past winners and short 
in past losers.  
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5. Data 
This section gives an overview of our sample, the ESG scores and the control variables. 
5.1 Data collection 
The data is collected from Thomson Reuters Datastream, Bloomberg Professional Services, 
Compustat Capital IQ, Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), Norges Bank, Nasdaq, Oslo 
Børs and Kenneth R. French Data Library. Our return metrics are obtained from Thomson 
Reuters Datastream, and stock returns are calculated based on Datastreams Return Index (RI), 
which includes the reinvestment of dividends. We use daily returns for Model 1 and monthly 
returns for Model 2 and for the estimation of betas, factor loadings, idiosyncratic risk and 
momentum. Accounting information and other firm characteristics are obtained from the 
Compustat annual database, and we use observations from the last available year. For more 
information, see the part on methodology and A.1. Monthly Fama-French factors for Europe 
are collected from Kenneth R. French Data Library, and the risk factors MKT-RF, HML, SMB 
and WML are used to estimate factor loadings. The measure on institutional shareholders is 
obtained from Bloomberg. 
Data is collected in the firms’ respective currencies (DKK, EUR, NOK and SEK), as this does 
not affect returns or most variables. Only when creating the variables for market cap, market 
share and BTM, we transform all data to NOK using exchange rates for the respective dates, 
obtained from Norges Bank. Refinitiv ESG scores are collected from Datastream and 
Sustainalytics ESG scores through Bloomberg.  
5.2 Sample 
We apply a relatively strict sampling process, which we deem necessary to control for all 
relevant variables. Our sample consists of Nordic firms listed on public stock exchanges in 
Denmark, Finland, Norway or Sweden. We restrict our sample to include equities active as of 
October 2020, and the sample is further restricted by the availability of ESG scores and 
accounting information. Icelandic firms are excluded due to insufficient data availability; 




Financial firms are excluded in our analysis due to the high leverage that is normal for those 
firms. The high leverage for financial firms probably does not have the same meaning as for 
non-financial firms, where high leverage in the latter indicates distress (Fama & French, 1992). 
Our primary dataset is based on daily observations for all Nordic firms for which a Refinitiv 
ESG score is available as of 01.01.2020, which amounts to 267 firms. When further restricted 
by accounting information availability, the final sample consists of 188 firms for which all 
necessary data is available. Of these firms, 72 also have a Sustainalytics score. The secondary 
dataset is a panel dataset that covers the period from 2015 to November 1, 2020, and the 
number of firms with ESG-rating increases with time, from 134 in 2015 to 267 in 2020. This 
dataset is also further restricted by the availability of accounting information, thus, the final 
sample consists of 171 firms for which all necessary data is available as of October 1, 2020, 
and 102 firms as of January 2015. We choose to include all 171 firms in the sample to optimize 
the utilization of the data. This makes the data unbalanced since some firms lack observations 
for the entire period. For the Sustainalytics ESG score, there are 45 firms as of January 2015 
and 74 as of October 1, 2020. When handling observations that are missing ESG scores but 
have ESG scores in previous periods, we assume the ESG score is constant and replace the 
missing values with the past ESG score. 
5.2.1  Sample description 
Our main sample of firms with Refinitiv ESG-scores consists of 50 % Swedish firms, 18.1 % 
Norwegian firms, 17 % Finnish firms and 14.9 % Danish firms, as shown in table 1. This is 
roughly in line with the relative size of the stock exchange in each country. Table 2 presents 
the SIC industry classification of the firms. Most of them, 56.4 %, are SIC-classified as 







Country Firms Percentage of Firms 
 1 SWE 94 50 % 
 2 NOR 34 18.1 % 
 3 FIN 32 17 % 
 4 DNK 28 14.9 % 




SIC Industry Classification Firms Percentage of Firms 
 1 Manufacturing 106 56.4 % 
 2 Services 29 15.4 % 
 3 Transportation & Public Utilities 17 9 % 
 4 Wholesale Trade 10 5.3 % 
 5 Construction 8 4.3 % 
 6 Mining 7 3.7 % 
 7 Retail Trade 7 3.7 % 
 8   Nonclassifiable Establishments 3 1.6 % 
 9  Agriculture, Forestry, & Fishing 1 0.5 % 
 
5.2.2 Benchmark indices and risk-free rates 
We choose our benchmark indices based on the firms’ country of listing. For Sweden, we use 
OMXS30, a market-weighted price index, consisting of the 30 most actively traded stocks on 
the Stockholm Stock Exchange. For Denmark, OMXC20, a market-weighted price index 
consisting of the 20 most actively traded shares on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. For 
Finland OMXH25, a capitalization-weighted stock price index, consisting of the 25 most 
actively traded stocks on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. For Norway, we use OBX, a 
capitalization-weighted stock price index, consisting of the 25 most actively traded stocks on 
the Oslo Stock Exchange. 
The majority of our sample firms are large, by Nordic standards, which is a characteristic 
shared by the index constituents, and each respective index covers between 20 and 50 percent 
of our sample firms by country. Thus, based on the index constituents and firm size, we 
conclude that the chosen indices are the best available proxy for a market benchmark. Data on 
benchmark indices are collected from Nasdaq and Oslo Børs. In consistency with the 
benchmark indices, risk-free rates are also chosen based on the firms’ country of listing. We 
use 10-year government bond yields, recalculated to daily and monthly rates for the respective 
models. The yields are obtained from Federal Reserve Economic Data. 
5.3 Our proxy for ESG: ESG scores 
Following the rapidly growing trend of sustainable investments, an increasing number of 
investors rely on ESG-information in their investments. In a survey by Amel-Zadeh and 





Serafeim (2018), 82.1 % of professional investors answered that they use ESG information in 
their investment decisions. Due to the high demand among investors for ESG data, a 
specialized industry of rating agencies has emerged offering a third-party assessment of firms’ 
ESG performance (Berg et al., 2019). The agencies collect and assess information of firms’ 
performance in a wide specter of sustainability topics, resulting in an issuance of a firm-
specific numeric ESG score or ESG rating. After a decade of growth and consolidations, the 
industry consists of few but large agencies (Escrig-Olmedo et al., 2018). These agencies have 
a major influence on sustainable investments as well as on the literature related to sustainable 
investments, with potentially far-reached effects (Berg et al., 2019). 
However, there are some challenges associated with ESG scores. Although large providers 
have emerged, there are significant variations in ESG scores across the agencies. Doyle (2018) 
points to several weaknesses in the ESG rating system, due to differences in methodology, 
subjective interpretation, or the individual agency's agenda. There are no standardized rules 
for the environment or social disclosures, nor is there a control mechanism for verifying 
reported data. The rating companies will consequently have to make assumptions, which 
results in a subjective assessment. Some organizations, such as the Sustainability Accounting 
Standards Board (SASB) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), work for a 
standardization, but there is still no consensus on a reporting standard for sustainability. Berg 
et al. (2019) have examined ESG scores from six key agencies considered as major players of 
the ESG data market and found a correlation in the range of 0.38 to 0.71, with an average of 
0.54. By disaggregating the ESG score, the authors found a correlation of 0.53 on the 
environmental factor, 0.42 on the social factor and 0.3 on the governance factor.  
5.3.1 Thomson Reuters Refinitiv and Sustainalytics  
Our main data source for ESG scores is the Thomson Reuters Refinitiv database, hereafter 
referred to as Refinitiv. According to Douglas et al. (2017) and Davis Polk (2017), Refinitiv 
(formerly Reuters) evaluates more measures and indicators than its competitors, which makes 
them cover the dimensions of sustainability in a better way. In contrast to several key agencies, 
Refinitiv does not rely on companies' input in their assessment of ESG score and only uses 
publicly available information, to preserve objectivity (Douglas et al., 2017).  
Due to the large deviations in ESG scores across providers (Doyle, 2018; Berg et al., 2019), 
we consider it appropriate to also include ESG scores from Sustainalytics as a secondary ESG 
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score, to examine if the results are consistent. Sustainalytics is the largest independent provider 
of ESG research and ratings to investors (Sustainalytics, 2020). According to Douglas et al. 
(2017), there is a trade-off between the coverage of firms and the coverage of issues, as 
Sustainalytics has the largest number of firms covered. In our case, Refinitiv has by far the 
best coverage of the publicly listed firms in the Nordic and will naturally be the primary ESG 
score used in this thesis. As the providers are commercial players, we do not have access to 
ESG scores from more than these two agencies, through the Norwegian School of Economics’ 
available databases. In our sample, when comparing the ESG scores for the firms that have 
both scores, we find a correlation of .75 between Refinitiv- and Sustainalytics scores and do 
not find that they are significantly different.  
5.3.2 The strucutre of ESG score 
Both ESG scores from Refinitiv and Sustainalytics are numerical, in the range of 0 to 100. 
Refinitiv structures its ESG score based on data firms report publicly, where they collect more 
than 450 ESG metrics (Refinitiv, 2020). Of these metrics, 186 are comparable measures, which 
in turn are divided into ten categories, as shown below in table 3. The score reflects a 
company's relative ESG performance, commitment, and effectiveness across those ten 
categories, as shown in table 3. 
In comparison, Sustainalytics measures a company’s exposure to industry-specific ESG risks 
and how well a firm manages those risks (Sustainalytics, 2020). Sustainalytics cover only 20 
ESG issues, far fewer than Refinitiv’s 186 measures. In both cases, the providers are opaque 
about which calculations are incorporated and how they are weighted (Douglas et al., 2017). 
Table 3 – The structure of the Refinitiv ESG score 
ESG Pillars Categories Number of Measures 

























To better isolate the effect of ESG, we control for market-based measures of risk, accounting-
based variables, other relevant variables, and industry- and country-fixed effects. See A.1 for 
the technical composition of the variables.  
5.4.1 Market-based measures of risk 
Following the Carhart Four-factor model, which is the basis of our model, we include the 
factor loadings (mi (Mkt_RF_Loading), (si (SMB_Loading), (hi (HML_Loading) and (wi 
(WML_Loading). Daniel and Titman (1997) argue that factor loadings are not always effective 
determinants of returns and show evidence that firm characteristics may also be important. 
Therefore, we include the size variable market cap (Mcap), book-to-market (BTM) and stock 
price momentum (Momentum) to our model. Another reason to include (Mcap) is to control 
for the effect that small cap firms tend to be more exposed to bankruptcy risk and poor 
performance during market contractionary periods (Switzer & Picard, 2020). We include a 
separate dummy variable for a negative book-to-market (BTMneg), as the returns of such 
companies tend to behave more like high book-to-market firms, instead of low book-to-
market, due to distress (Lins et al., 2017). We also include idiosyncratic risk (Idiosyncratic) 
because idiosyncratic stock price volatility can affect the returns, according to Goyal and 
Santa-Clara (2003).  
5.4.2 Accounting-based variables 
To control for financial flexibility, through liquidity and leverage, we include the variables 
cash and short-term investments (Cash), long-term debt (LtDebt) and short-term debt 
(StDebt). Return on assets (ROA) and the indicator of loss (Loss) are included as measures of 
profitability. As mentioned in the literature review, profitability, liquidity and low borrowing 
have been significant for firms' resilience during crises (Bernanke & Gertler, 1989; 
Bhattacharya et al., 2010; Duchin et al., 2010). Also, Eugster et al. (2020) found that high-
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dividend stocks performed better than low-dividend stocks in Europe during the COVID-19 
pandemic. Thus, the firm’s dividend payout ratio (DivPayout) is included.  
At the beginning of the pandemic, there were concerns related to supply chain difficulties. 
To capture a potential effect on returns, we include the variable inventory turnover ratio 
(InvTurn) as a measure of companies’ integration of the supply chain. Due to great variation 
between industries, the inventory turnover ratio variable is industry-adjusted as these are 
more accurate and stable than unadjusted ratios, in line with Platt and Platt (1990).  
Several studies support the notion that intangible assets have a positive and significant effect 
on firms’ financial performance (Lantz & Sahut, 2005; Zhang, 2017). According to Landini 
et al. (2018), intangibles strengthen firms’ resilience to unexpected shocks and directly 
reduce the probability of bankruptcy, based on evidence from the financial crisis. The 
intangible assets from the companies’ balance sheets are included as the variable acquired 
intangible assets (AcqIntang). Most internally developed intangible assets are not 
recognizable on the balance sheet; therefore, some assumptions and calculations must be 
made. Enache and Srivastava (2018) propose a new method to estimate intangible 
investment outlay, other than research and development (R&D) expenses. The RD_SGA 
variable reflects the idea that both research and development (R&D) expenditures and 1/3 of 
sales, general and administrative (SG&A) expenditures would reflect investment in 
intangible assets, with a 5-year horizon (Demers et al., 2020; Enache & Srivastava, 2018; 
Lev & Sougiannis, 1996).  
5.4.3 Other relevant control variables 
We also include the variable Institutional ownership (Inst_Owners). Cella et al. (2013) show 
evidence that institutional investors with a longer trading horizon, sell their shares to a lesser 
extent during market turmoil than other investors with short-term strategies. On the other hand, 
as discussed by Heyden and Heyden (2020), institutional investors are often better informed 
than other participants in the market and are able to engage in short selling, which may 
adversely affect the share price. The authors further refer to the proportion of institutional 
investors as a commonly used proxy for the amount of short sales.  
Market share (MktShare) is included as a measure of market power. Several studies have found 
a positive relationship between market power variables and stock market returns (i.e., Sullivan, 




across industries, thus, controlling for the fact that industries were affected differently by 
COVID-19. Finally, we include country fixed effects, to control for the fact that the pandemic 
affected the Nordic countries differently and that the COVID-related fiscal and monetary 
policies vary between countries. 
5.5 Descriptive statistics 
When comparing the Reuters- and Sustainalytics samples in tables 4 and 5, we notice that the 
average market cap for Sustainalytics rated firms is twice that of the sample of Reuters-rated 
firms. The average market share is also considerably higher for the Sustainalytics rated firms. 
This implies that Sustainalytics covers the large and powerful amongst the Nordic firms, to a 
further extent than Reuters. 
Table 4 - The table summarizes the 188 firms with Refinitiv ESG scores, for the crisis 
period. Continuous variables are winsorized at a 1 pct level. 
 Mean St.dev Min Pctl.5% Median Pctl.95% Max 
ESG 54.658 18.352 2.950 24.879 54.815 82.952 90.480 
Refinitiv.ENSCORE 48.725 25.174 0.000 6.715 49.910 87.809 94.730 
Refinitiv.SOSCORE 59.986 19.742 5.860 23.090 59.595 87.901 95.000 
Refinitiv.CGSCORE 52.257 22.488 1.330 15.442 52.575 88.626 96.680 
Loss 0.133 0.340 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BTMneg 0.011 0.103 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Inst_Owners 59.446 21.593 3.904 22.701 60.179 94.883 113.345 
Cash 0.122 0.169 0.001 0.009 0.072 0.449 0.940 
LTDebt 0.215 0.154 0.000 0.011 0.190 0.512 0.864 
STDebt 0.056 0.058 0.000 0.005 0.036 0.196 0.307 
ROA 0.040 0.135 -0.841 -0.102 0.049 0.193 0.293 
AcqIntang 0.268 0.214 0.000 0.002 0.212 0.636 0.834 
RD_SGA 0.270 0.290 0.001 0.015 0.188 0.806 2.280 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.763 0.485 -0.437 0.012 0.753 1.480 2.587 
SMB_Loading 0.363 0.178 0.105 0.184 0.318 0.709 1.384 
HML_Loading 2.433 1.490 -1.252 0.071 2.484 4.819 5.280 
WML_Loading 0.147 0.242 0.000 0.000 0.016 0.702 0.948 
Idiosyncratic 0.085 0.038 0.035 0.046 0.074 0.153 0.246 
DivPayout 3.097 15.482 -40.861 -2.997 0.952 11.857 135.173 
Mcap MNOK      43337         64810        605        2444         15532         222216        275278 
MktShare 0.163 0.231 0.000 0.001 0.063 0.638 1.000 
BTM 0.451 0.556 -0.079 0.025 0.308 1.180 4.390 
Momentum 0.301 0.425 -0.870 -0.367 0.322 0.871 2.293 
InvTurn 0.667 1.287 0.000 0.000 0.353 1.821 10.393 
BHAR -0.103 0.164 -0.694 -0.350 -0.102 0.168 0.396 
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Table 5 - The table summarizes the 72 firms with Sustainalytics ESG scores scores, 
for the crisis period. Continuous variables are winsorized at a 1 pct level. 
 Mean St.dev Min Pctl.5% Median Pctl.95% Max 
Sustainalytics G 72.496 27.318 4.255 12.294 83.586 100.000 100.000 
Sustainalytics S 70.052 25.935 0.000 14.476 77.430 98.560 100.000 
Sustainalytics E 64.129 29.141 0.000 13.001 72.020 97.737 99.306 
Sustainalytics ESG 70.292 27.546 2.083 11.896 80.688 98.273 100.000 
Loss 0.083 0.278 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 
BTMneg 0.028 0.165 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 
Inst_Owners 60.127 18.157 18.964 34.821 62.957 89.255 98.071 
Cash 0.103 0.111 0.005 0.008 0.077 0.289 0.724 
LTDebt 0.200 0.159 0.006 0.016 0.172 0.489 0.864 
STDebt 0.050 0.054 0.002 0.005 0.035 0.130 0.284 
ROA 0.070 0.101 -0.437 -0.021 0.056 0.274 0.293 
AcqIntang 0.233 0.216 0.000 0.003 0.155 0.619 0.834 
RD_SGA 0.225 0.194 0.002 0.009 0.183 0.552 0.981 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.742 0.429 -0.171 0.104 0.703 1.391 2.432 
SMB_Loading 0.308 0.134 0.105 0.161 0.269 0.622 0.717 
HML_Loading 2.696 1.445 -0.380 0.360 2.600 5.048 5.280 
WML_Loading 0.125 0.241 0.000 0.000 0.012 0.709 0.948 
Idiosyncratic 0.074 0.033 0.035 0.042 0.064 0.143 0.184 
DivPayout 4.693 17.360 -7.670 -1.221 1.062 25.420 135.173 
Mcap MNOK       87847     85534 756      5347       58634       263830        275278 
MktShare 0.221 0.238 0.000 0.002 0.131 0.610 0.990 
BTM 0.524 0.665 -0.079 0.016 0.349 1.587 4.390 
Momentum 0.286 0.340 -0.544 -0.247 0.345 0.778 1.805 
InvTurn 0.604 0.952 0.000 0.000 0.353 1.425 5.730 








Our methodology consists of two models: a main- and secondary model. The main model, 
which addresses the COVID-19 stock market itself, is a cross-sectional model using Buy-and-
Hold Abnormal Returns for the crisis- and rebound periods. We further extend our scope in a 
second model, with a fixed-effects regression model using panel data dating back to 2015.  
6.1 The COVID-19 Stock Market 
6.1.1 The crisis period 
According to Nofsinger and Varma (2014), a crisis is defined as a big fall in the stock market. 
In this context, we find it appropriate to use the OMXN40 index as a benchmark for the Nordic 
market. Consistent with Nofsinger and Varma (2014), we define our crisis period based on the 
peak and trough, from February 19 at 1829.88 points to March 23 at 1261.57 points. This is a 
decrease of 31.06 percent, as illustrated in figure 2. Furthermore, if we define the crisis period 
in the context of a beer market caused by a stock market crash, we get the same start and end 
dates. A bear market is understood as the period when the index fell at least 20% from its 
previous peak (Gonzalez et al., 2005). A new all-time high was reached on August 12, at 
1834.18 points, which means the bear market ended when it bottomed on March 23. 
6.1.2 The rebound period 
In addition to the crisis, the COVID-19 stock market is characterized by a steep rebound, 
during which the global equity markets almost fully recovered in just a few months. Thus, we 
find it relevant to also test the effect of ESG during the market rebound between March 23 and 
June 5, when OMXN40 had grown to 1734.15 and recovered to about 95% of the drop before 
somewhat stabilizing. Based on the movements of OMXN40, our period of interest can then 
be defined as February 19 to June 5. This also corresponds with the movements of the CBOE 
Volatility Index (VIX), often regarded as a measure of market sentiment. The VIX started a 
steep climb from 14.38 points on February 19, topped out at 82,69 points on March 16, then 
fell until it reached a temporary bottom at 24.52 points on June 5. The movements of OMXN40 
and VIX are illustrated in figure 3. 
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Figure 3 – OMXN40 and VIX during the period of interest, with the points of 
OMXN40 and VIX on the left and right side respectively. 
 
 
6.2 Model 1: Buy-and-Hold Abnormal Returns  
To examine the effect of ESG, we find it most appropriate to measure the abnormal return for 
the crisis- and rebound periods. The use of abnormal return as a dependent variable is in line 
with similar studies which examine the effect of ESG on stock market performance during 
crises (Lins et al., 2017; Albuquerque et al., 2020; Ding et al., 2020; Takahashi & Yamada, 
2020; Demers et al., 2020). The abnormal return is calculated as the difference between the 
realized return and a firm’s expected return based on an asset pricing model over a set period, 
expressed in equation 4. 
5678#9:;	#<=>#7!,# =	#!,# − !#!,# (4) 
The abnormal return corrects for a stock’s expected reaction to the market crisis and reflects 
the unanticipated profit or loss generated by the specific stock. The market model (MM) is 
one of the most commonly used models for estimating the expected returns for abnormal 





























@!,# 	= 	A!,# + (!,##&,# +	B!,# (5) 
Although there are more sophisticated models, the market model is preferred by several 
researchers. Brown and Warner (1985) recommend the market model, as it yields similar 
results as more complex models. Campbell et al. (1997) also favor the market model, as it does 
not increase the variance of abnormal returns or impose any restrictions on expected returns 
compared to more complex models. According to Holler (2012), the model is the most 
accurate in calculating the normal returns. Amongst relevant literature, Demers et al. (2020) 
use MM while Albuquerque et al. (2020) use CAPM. We therefore also check if our results 
are consistent when using CAPM.  
In the recent finance literature, the measures cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) and buy-
and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are commonly used to calculate abnormal returns. The 
CAR method uses arithmetic calculation, while the BHAR method uses geometric calculation, 
which includes the effect of compounding. For short horizons, both the CAR and BHAR 
provide quite similar results, and the choice of method will not lead to significant differences. 
For longer time-horizons, several economists suggest using the BHAR method, arguing that 
CARs are not appealing on economic grounds and may cause biased predictors relative to 
BHAR (Ritter, 1991; Barber & Lyon, 1997; Lyon et al., 1999). Barber and Lyon (1997) show 
evidence that CAR generates larger abnormal returns compared to BHAR in a period of one 
year due to ignorance of the compounding effect. The authors further argue that CAR may 
lead to incorrect inferences. Based on this discussion, we find that BHAR is the stronger of 
the two measures. Lyon et al. (1999) add that CAR and BHAR answer slightly different 
questions. The BHAR is warranted if the purpose is to answer whether sample firms earned 
abnormal stock returns over a particular time horizon, as is the case in our study, while CAR 
describes whether sample firms persistently earn abnormal returns. BHAR and CAR are 
presented in equations 6 and 7.	
/05@!,+ = DE"1 + #!,#$ − 1
+
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The choice of BHAR as the dependent variable is also in line with Demers et al. (2020) and 
Takahashi and Yamada (2020). The BHAR of firm i is calculated by deducting the product of 
the expected daily returns from the product of the buy-and-hold daily returns for period T. For 
the firm-specific expected return, we use the 60-months estimated beta, exposed to the market 
risk premium for each country3. Our full regression of model 1 is presented in equation 8. We 
also test the model using CAR to investigate whether the choice of the dependent variable 
affects the ESG coefficient.  
/05@! 	= 		 (- +	(%!-K! + ((.L=@M_18:OP7Q! + ()0.1_18:OP7Q!
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6.3 Model 2: Panel Data 
Although model 1 is in line with the majority of research on ESG and performance during 
COVID-19, it only addresses the periods independently. We therefore include another model 
to investigate whether the ESG scores' effect is different during the crisis- and rebound periods 
compared to ordinary times. This model is inspired by Lins et al. (2017), who examine whether 
the effect of CSR is different in the post- and pre-crisis periods compared with the crisis period 
of the financial crisis in 2008-2009. In our model 2, we use panel data with monthly 
observations for companies with ESG scores dated back to January 2015. The choice of 
monthly returns is made to reduce potential noise arising from a higher return frequency and 
due to computational limitations. Consequently, the crisis period is defined as February and 
March, while the rebound covers April and May. Due to the exponential growth in the number 
 





of firms with ESG scores (the number has doubled since 2015), and a low number of rated 
firms before 2015, we do not include earlier years.  
The main benefit of panel data is that it can handle both firm-specific and time-specific effects. 
Through controlling for these largely unobserved effects, omitted variable bias can be reduced 
and inference improved (Stock & Watson, 2011, p.354). Panel data might also reduce the 
issues of multicollinearity that arise for the cross-sectional samples in Model 1. Although 
model 2 has some benefits compared to model 1, we nonetheless approach model 1 as a 
primary model, for several reasons. The methodology of model 1 enables us to easily compare 
our results with previous research. Further, due to the use of monthly observations in model 
2, model 1 more precisely isolates the crisis and rebound periods. 
The dependent variable of Model 2 is the monthly abnormal return. Due to the nature of the 
panel data, we do not use the BHAR or CAR, as this would be incompatible with the panel 
data methodology in model 2. The expected return of the stocks is calculated using the rolling 
market model regressions with a 60-month estimation window. Our regression model is 
presented in equation 9. 
 












Crisist is a dummy variable set to 1 in the crisis period, and Reboundt is a dummy variable set 
1 in the rebound period after the crisis. ∑ ('e',!#'',*  represents the complete set of control 
variables and factor loadings from equation 8.  ∑ f5!555,(  represents the entity fixed effects. 
f5 is the coefficient for the binary dummy entity !5. ∑ b#R###,(  represents the time fixed 
effects, and b# represents the coefficient for the time binary dummy regressor R#. We do not 
include variables for industry and country because these are time-invariant characteristics that 
do not change over time and are already controlled for using fixed effects.  
(9)	
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6.4 Estimation of variables 
We estimate betas, factor loadings, idiosyncratic risk and calculate momentum. Firm betas are 
estimated using a rolling market model with a 60-month estimation window, which is the 
period that generates the most accurate beta forecast according to Cenesizoglu et al. (2016). 
At least 12 months of return data is required for each firm. Idiosyncratic risk is the residual 
variance from these market-model regressions. The regression specification for this 
estimation, for company i, at time t, is as follows: 
#!,# 	= (- + (%#&,# + B!,# (10)	
We estimate factor loadings on Mkt-RF, SMB, HML and WML the same way,  by regressing 
firm-specific returns on Kenneth French’s Fama-French European three-factors and 
momentum factor, using rolling regressions with a 60-month estimation window. The 
regression specification for company i, at time t, is presented as: 
#!,# 	= (- + (%.L=@M + ((-./ + ()0.1 +	(*3.1 +	B!,# (11)	
Momentum is calculated as the rolling, raw buy-and-hold returns of the past 12 months. In the 
regressions, betas, factor loadings, idiosyncratic risk and momentum are updated monthly 
based on the rolling estimates. 
6.5 Functional form and specification 
For each sample and period of interest, we run different specifications, gradually adding 
variables to the models, before finishing with the restricted model. In this section, we use the 
models that are run on the defined crisis period to illustrate our process of testing and 
constructing the models. We have applied the same process to the models run on the other 
time periods, but find it excessive to report all these steps. 
6.5.1 Model 1 – Cross-sectional 
Functional form 
To find the correct functional form, we use the Ramsey RESET test for nested models and the 
Davidson-MacKinnon J test for non-nested models (Wooldridge, 2016, p. 304). Based on the 




since it is the only control variable in absolute form. The tests indicate no other changes in 
functional form. None of the tests rejects the null of correct functional form, and we conclude 
that our model does not have an incorrect functional form. 
Multicollinearity 
Because of the sample size and similarities of variables, we suspect that the inclusion of both 
market variables and Fama French factor loadings might cause multicollinearity issues. To 
check this, we apply a Generalized Variance Inflation Test (GVIF) (Fox & Monette, 1992). 
For our models, the GVIF test is preferred above the standard VIF test because of the inclusion 
of categorical variables; industry- and country-fixed effects.  
The test indicates multicollinearity in the sample with Reuters-rated firms, especially between 
SMB_Loading and Idiosyncratic risk. Although there are no detected multicollinearity issues 
in the variable of interest, ESG, but in control variables only, we improve the model to make 
the control variables interpretable. After testing different model specifications and rerunning 
GVIF tests on the different specifications, we find that the exclusion of SMB_Loading and 
MktShare effectively reduces multicollinearity. The GVIF test for the Reuters sample is 
presented in table A.15. 
For the sample consisting of firms with Sustainalytics ESG scores, multicollinearity issues are 
more serious, probably due to the smaller sample size (72). The GVIF test detects potential 
multicollinearity in the variable of interest, Sustainalytics ESG score. After removing some 
variables and testing different model specifications, we decide on a specification that reduces 
the issue of multicollinearity and still controls for the most important factors. This 
specification excludes SMB_Loading, HML_Loading, WML_Loading, BTM, BTMneg, 
Idiosyncratic and InvTurn. The GVIF test for the Sustainalytics sample is presented in table 
A.15. 
There appears to be a lack of consensus in the literature as to what is the correct cutoff value 
in a GVIF or VIF test. Opinions range between a cutoff of 5 (Ringle et al., 2015) and 10 (Hair 
et al., 1995).  With this in mind, we regard a value below ten as acceptable for control variables 
and conclude that the GVIF-values for our specifications are acceptable. See A.2 for a 
complete correlation matrix. 
Overfitting 
Our large number of independent variables, relative to the number of firms, might cause an 
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overfitted model (Babyak, 2004; Green, 1991). Demers et al. (2020) apply even more variables 
in their model but on a much larger sample size. Thus, we might not be able to include all 
relevant variables in our models. 
We check for overfitting by examining R-squared, adjusted R-squared and Predicted R-
squared. Predicted R-squared estimates what the R-squared would be if the model was fitted 
to new data (Allen, 1974). Thus, it is a way of measuring the loss of explanatory power when 
the model is applied to new data. Predicted R-squared is calculated as follows: 





R-squares for the crisis period are presented in table A.16.The ratio between R-squared and 
adjusted R-squared, and the difference between R-squared and predicted R-squared indicates 
that there might be problems with overfitting in the model. After trying different model 
specifications, with fewer variables, we find that our original specification still performs best 
when comparing the different R-squares. In addition, we emphasize that our primary focus 
should be on detecting significance, rather than chasing explanatory power. We therefore 
regard the predicted R-squared as acceptable and choose to avoid the removal of explanatory 
variables and accept the moderate indications of overfitting.  
Restricted models 
To reduce the weakness that might result from the ratio between the high number of variables 
and the sample size, we also design restricted models. These models contain only variables 
that contribute statistically to the model. This is done using F-tests and including only the 
variables that reduce the model’s residual sum of squares. We regard these restricted models 
as the most precise and robust amongst the models. The variables included vary with sample 
and time period. For some time periods and especially for the samples of firms with 
Sustainalytics rating, the issues of overfitting are more problematic than for the main sample. 
Therefore, in these cases, the restricted model must be regarded as a significantly better model 
than the models containing more control variables. In section 7, these issues are pointed out 




increase in predicted R-squared indicates that the issues of overfitting are successfully reduced 
by restricting the models (Table A.16). 
Heteroskedasticity 
We apply the Breusch-Pagan test to identify problems with heteroskedasticity. Only in the 
model specifications where the test detects heteroskedasticity, we use robust standard errors. 
For the standard errors, we apply bias-reduced linearization (BRL), which reduces the bias in 
the Eicker-Huber-White variance estimator and a Bell-McCaffrey degrees-of-freedom 
adjustment (Bell & McCaffrey, 2002) based on the bias-reduced estimators. The use of BRL 
and degrees-of-freedom adjustment is discussed by Imbens and Kolesár (2016). They 
recommend this method over the traditional Eicker-Huber-White method, which relies on 
large samples, and they argue that the Bell-McCaffrey method performs better for small and 
moderately sized samples and when the distribution of the independent variables is skewed. 
When taking the number of control variables into account, our sample size is moderate, and 
many of the variables have considerable right-skewed distributions. Hence, we believe the 
Bell-McCaffrey adjustment should perform well on our sample. 
6.5.2 Model 2 – Panel Data 
We roughly use the same functional form and specification as in Model 1, with minor 
modifications. To find the optimal regression method for our panel data, we apply several 
tests. Using an F-test for individual effects, we find that there are significant individual fixed 
effects. In addition, a Lagrange Multiplier Test indicates that there are significant time-fixed 
effects. These results indicate that a pooled OLS should not be used. To further decide between 
a random- or fixed-effect estimation approach, we use a Hausman test, which indicates that 
we should use fixed effects. No problems with multicollinearity are detected using VIF-tests. 
Nor do we identify issues with overfitting when the model is applied to panel data, through 
the examination of predicted R-squared. We see that using panel data somewhat reduces the 
challenges associated with the combination of our moderate sample and the many independent 
variables. Still, as in model 1, we design restricted models, consisting only of variables that 
contribute significantly to the model. 
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation 
Potential problems with heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are handled using clustering. 
Standard clustering methods can perform poorly when the number of independent clusters is 
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limited (Pustejovsky & Tipton, 2016). Therefore, as with the cross-sectional model, we use 
BRL and adjusted degrees of freedom. The original Bell-McAffrey formulation of BRL does 
not work in a model with both entity- and time-fixed effects, such as ours. We therefore use a 
generalization of BRL, which works in models with arbitrary sets of fixed effects, as proposed 
by Pustejovsky and Tipton (2016). We apply the Breusch-Pagan test to identify problems with 
heteroskedasticity and use robust standard errors only where heteroskedasticity is detected. 
6.6  Robustness tests 
We include several robustness tests to check the coherence and sensitivity of our main 
findings. In addition, the models will be tested using CAR and CAPM. 
6.6.1 Disaggregated ESG 
As mentioned in the literature review, Hoepner et al. (2016) highlight engagement in the 
environmental dimension, as the most effective in lowering downside risk. Albuquerque et al. 
(2020) only examine the Environmental and Social dimensions of ESG, to avoid capturing the 
governance effect, as well-governed firms invest more in ES-policies. To investigate whether 
any of the dimensions are more prominent, and to control for a potential governance effect, 
we use disaggregated ESG scores in our model.  
6.6.2 ESG quartiles 
By using quartiles, instead of a linear score, we can assess if the effect of a company's ESG 
score changes between different levels of ESG score. We will regress BHAR on ESG score 
quartiles with dummies for quartiles 2 to 4 together with control variables from the restricted 
model. 
6.6.3 Country interactions 
To investigate whether ESG may have a different effect across the Nordic countries, we have 
re-estimated Model 1 with dummy variables for Norway, Denmark, and Finland. We create 




6.6.4 ESG scores from Sustainalytics 
Due to the large deviations in ESG scores across providers (Berg et al., 2019; Doyle, 2018), 
we also use ESG scores from Sustainalytics in our main estimations from models 1 and 2.  
6.6.5 Restricted sample 
When comparing the models using different ESG scores, different results might be caused by 
the differences in samples. Our samples consist of 188 firms with Reuters scores, and 72 of 
these firms also have the Sustainalytics score. To reduce any noise arising from sample 
differences, we also run the Reuters regressions on this restricted sample of 72 firms.  
6.6.6 Others 
We control if model 1 is robust to the application of a shorter rebound period, using the 
immediate rebound that ended April 29. On a side note, we also test if the fact that a firm has 
an ESG score or not influences the abnormal return. This is done using a dummy variable 
representing if the firm is ESG-rated. We further investigate which factors influence the 
probability of being ESG scored, through a linear probability model with the ESG-dummy as 
the dependent variable. We use the sample of 720 firms for which all variables, except ESG 
score, are available. This will not be discussed in detail, as the focus in our thesis is on the 
samples of firms with ESG scores, but is included to identify a possible sampling bias. 
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7. Results from the Empirical Analysis 
The main purpose of this study is to examine the effect of ESG during the COVID-19 stock 
market. Therefore, our focus is primarily on the ESG variable rather than a detailed 
presentation of the variables associated with the abnormal returns. In unreported results, all 
findings are robust to the application of CAPM instead of MM. We report three decimals for 
the coefficients, when possible, therefore some rounding occurs. 
7.1 Results from the defined crisis period 
Table 6 presents the results of various estimates of model 1 using BHAR during the crisis 
period. In the first column (1), the ESG score is significant at 0.05 level in explaining the 
BHAR. An increase of 1 point in the ESG score positively affects the abnormal returns with 
0.2 percentage points. However, the explanatory power is small, where ESG in isolation only 
explains about 3% of the overall variation. In column (2), we add country and industry fixed 
effects, and the ESG score is no longer significant. ESG remains insignificant from column 
(2) to column (7) where we gradually add more variables. As shown in column (7), the most 
prominent variables that contribute positively are the Mkt-RF factor loading, return on assets 
and size (Mcap). The HML factor loading, long-term debt and the proportion of institutional 
investors contributed negatively. The coefficients’ values and significance levels remain 
largely unchanged across the estimations. In the appendix, table A.1 column (1), the CAR is 
regressed on the restricted model 1 for the crisis period, which shows that ESG is insignificant.  
 
Table 6: Crisis period with ESG scores from Refinitiv 
Table 6 presents the results from regressing BHAR on the Refinitiv ESG score and the 
control variables for the crisis sample. In column (1), we only regress BHAR on the ESG 
score. In column (2), we add country- and industry-fixed effects. In column (3), we add the 
Fama-French + momentum factor loadings. In column (4), we add more market-based 
measures of risk. We remove the SMB-Factor loading due to issues with multicollinearity. In 
column (5), we add the accounting-based variables. In column (6), we regress BHAR on the 
complete model 1. In column (7), we regress BHAR on the restricted model.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ESG 0.002** 0.0003 0.0004 0.0003 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0003 




Mkt_RF_Loading   0.242*** 0.251*** 0.284*** 0.284*** 0.202*** 
   (0.053) (0.048) (0.048) (0.047) (0.031) 
HML_Loading   -0.047** -0.049*** -0.057*** -0.055*** -0.036*** 
   (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.012) 
WML_Loading   0.044 0.074 0.071 0.063  
   (0.080) (0.081) (0.074) (0.072)  
SMB_Loading   -0.171     
   (0.114)     
BTM    -0.034 0.001 -0.007  
    (0.028) (0.026) (0.026)  
BTMneg    -0.001 0.129 0.082  
    (0.122) (0.123) (0.121)  
Momentum    0.002 -0.033 -0.035  
    (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)  
Idiosyncratic    -1.117** -0.595 -0.712  
    (0.515) (0.568) (0.553)  
Cash     -0.172* -0.170*  
     (0.101) (0.098)  
LTDebt     -0.328*** -0.334*** -0.220*** 
     (0.094) (0.091) (0.070) 
STDebt     0.058 0.001  
     (0.199) (0.194)  
ROA     0.031 0.044 0.245*** 
     (0.118) (0.115) (0.076) 
Loss     -0.054 -0.054  
     (0.038) (0.037)  
InvTurn     0.002 0.002  
     (0.008) (0.008)  
AcqIntang     -0.121** -0.096 -0.059 
     (0.060) (0.058) (0.051) 
RD_SGA     0.030 0.014  
     (0.042) (0.041)  
log(Mcap)     0.038*** 0.035*** 0.031*** 
     (0.011) (0.011) (0.010) 
DivPayout     -0.001* -0.001*  
     (0.001) (0.001)  
Inst_Owners      -0.002*** -0.001*** 
      (0.001) (0.0005) 
Constant -0.198*** -0.118 -0.060 -0.024 -0.394** -0.343* -0.426*** 
 (0.042) (0.155) (0.147) (0.148) (0.183) (0.178) (0.158) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Adjusted R2 0.033 0.210 0.350 0.355 0.501 0.530 0.527 




7.1.1 Disaggregated ESG scores 
In table A.2, the ESG score is disaggregated into the environmental, social and governance 
scores, and restricted models are run for each of the scores. None of the disaggregated scores 
are significant, while all control variables except AcqIntang are significant at a .01 level. 
7.1.2 Differences between countries 
When running the restricted model with interactions between ESG and countries, we find no 
significant differences in the effects of ESG across countries. See table A.4, column (1). 
Compared to Swedish firms, the Finnish firms had on average 19.6 percentage points lower 
abnormal returns during the crisis period, significant on a .05 level. All control variables 
except AcqIntang are significant at a .01 level. 
7.1.3 ESG scores by quartile 
As shown in table A.5, column (1), none of the ESG score quartiles have a significant effect 
on BHAR for the crisis period. All control variables except AcqIntang are significant at a .01 
level. 
7.1.4 Sustainalytics 
Table A.8 presents the results from regressing BHAR on Sustainalytics’ ESG score and the 
control variables for the crisis sample. The ESG score remains significant until column (2) 
when fixed effects are included. In column (3), by adding the Fama-French + momentum 
factor loadings, the significance of ESG disappears. The ESG score remains insignificant in 
column (4) when all control variables are added, and in column (5) when we include the 
control variables from the restricted model.  
Table A.10. presents the results from a strict sample consisting of firms that have been given 
ESG scores from both Refinitiv and Sustainalytics. Columns (1) and (2) show that both ESG 
scores are insignificant during the crisis period. 
7.2 Results from the Rebound Period 
In table 7, except from columns (5) and (6), the ESG score is significantly negatively 




SMB_Loading is removed due to issues with multicollinearity. In columns (5) and (6), we 
detect issues of overfitting, hence we do not regard these models as precise estimates of the 
relationship between ESG and BHAR. Therefore, the restricted model in column (7) is the 
strongest of the models for this sample. In column (7), the restricted model, increasing the 
ESG score by 1-point negatively affects the BHAR by 0.03 percentage points. Among the 
prominent control variables, Mkt-RF contributes negatively, while cash and acquired 
intangible assets contribute positively. The results of the rebound period are also consistent 
when using CAR as the dependent variable, as shown in the appendix, table A.1, column (2). 
Table 7: Rebound period with ESG scores from Refinitiv 
Table 7 presents the results from regressing BHAR on the Refinitiv ESG score and the control 
variables for the rebound sample. In column (1), we only regress BHAR on the ESG score. In 
column (2), we add country- and industry fixed effects. In column (3), we add the Fama-
French + momentum factor loadings. In column (4), we add more market-based measures of 
risk. We remove the SMB-Factor loading due to issues with multicollinearity. In column (5), 
we add the accounting-based variables. In column (6), we regress BHAR on the complete 
model 1. In column (7), we regress BHAR on the restricted model. 
 
 Dependent variable:   
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)  
ESG -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.004** -0.003* -0.002 -0.002 -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)         
Mkt_RF_Loading   -0.289** -0.369*** -0.453*** -0.453*** -0.250*** 
   (0.112) (0.102) (0.115) (0.115) (0.052)         
HML_Loading   0.029 0.047 0.073* 0.073*  
   (0.040) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041)          
WML_Loading   0.021 -0.074 -0.106 -0.101  
   (0.169) (0.173) (0.176) (0.176)          
SMB_Loading   0.080     
   (0.242)             
BTM    -0.018 -0.052 -0.048  
    (0.059) (0.063) (0.063)          
BTMneg    -0.026 -0.111 -0.085 0.184 
    (0.259) (0.294) (0.297) (0.254)         
Momentum    0.062 0.070 0.071 0.073 
    (0.057) (0.064) (0.064) (0.055)         
Idiosyncratic    1.686 2.087 2.152  
    (1.099) (1.355) (1.361)          
Cash     0.314 0.313 0.298* 
     (0.240) (0.240) (0.164)         
LTDebt     0.305 0.308  
     (0.224) (0.224)          
STDebt     -0.665 -0.633  
     (0.474) (0.478)          
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ROA     0.308 0.301  
     (0.282) (0.283)          
Loss     0.056 0.056  
     (0.091) (0.091)          
InvTurn     0.006 0.006  
     (0.020) (0.020)          
AcqIntang     0.342** 0.328** 0.325** 
     (0.142) (0.144) (0.134)         
RD_SGA     0.043 0.052  
     (0.101) (0.102)          
log(Mcap)     -0.011 -0.010  
     (0.026) (0.027)          
DivPayout     0.003** 0.003** 0.002 
     (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)         
Inst_Owners      0.001 0.001 
      (0.001) (0.001)         
Constant 0.604*** 0.211 0.162 0.031 -0.098 -0.126 0.043 
 (0.075) (0.315) (0.313) (0.316) (0.435) (0.438) (0.296)          
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Adjusted R2 0.120 0.267 0.343 0.345 0.367 0.364 0.375  
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
7.2.1 Disaggregated ESG scores 
In table A.3, the ESG score is disaggregated and run on restricted models for each of the scores 
in the same way as in subsection 7.1.1. All the disaggregated ESG scores are negatively 
associated with abnormal returns during the rebound period. The environmental score is 
significant at a .05 level, while the social score and governance score are significant at a .1 
level. All the coefficients are -.002, which means an increase of 1-point of the respective score, 
negatively affects the abnormal return by .02 percentage points.  
7.2.2 Country aggregated ESG scores 
In table A.4 column (2), we run the restricted model between ESG and the countries for the 
rebound period. We do not find any significant differences in the effects of ESG across 
countries. Nor do we find any significant differences across the countries on abnormal returns 




7.2.3 ESG scores by quartile 
As shown in table A.5 column (2), none of the ESG-quartiles have a significant effect on 
BHAR during the rebound period.  
7.2.4 Sustainalytics 
Table A.9 presents the results from regressing BHAR on Sustainalytics’ ESG score and the 
control variables for the rebound sample. In column (1), ESG is negatively associated with 
abnormal returns during the rebound period, at a .05 significance level. When fixed effects are 
added, the ESG score becomes insignificant. The ESG score remains insignificant from 
column (2) to (5) when more control variables gradually are added and when BHAR is 
regressed on the restricted model. 
Table A.10 presents the results of the strict sample of firms that have been given ESG score 
from both Refintiv and Sustainalytics. Columns (3) and (4) show that both Refinitiv- and 
Sustianalytics ESG scores are insignificant in the explanation of BHAR in the rebound period.  
7.2.5 Shorter rebound period 
The results from the shorter rebound period are shown in table A.6. When running the models 
on a rebound period that ends on April 29, the coefficient of the ESG effect is significant in 
all specifications. Suggesting that the relationship is somewhat stronger during April and the 
end of March. The ESG coefficient in columns (6) and (7) indicates that a 1-point increase in 
ESG decreases BHAR by .3 percentage points. In the restricted model (7) all control variables 
except Momentum are significant at a .1 level or less. For columns (5) and (6) the issues of 
overfitting are now less severe than for the longer rebound period. 
Table A.7 presents several robustness tests for the shorter rebound period. In columns (1) and 
(3) Environmental score and Governmental score are significant at a .05 and .01 level 
respectively, but in column (2) Social score is not significant. In column (4) we do not find 
any significant differences in the effects of ESG across countries, nor any significant 
differences between the countries in terms of abnormal returns. In the ESG quartile 
specification in column (5), we find that firms in quartiles 3 and 4 perform significantly weaker 
than firms in quartile 1. On average, compared to the first quartile, firms in the third quartile 
underperformed by 8.5 percentage points, significant at a .1 level, and firms in the fourth 
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quartile underperformed by 11.1 percentage points, significant at a .05 level. In column (6) the 
Sustainalytics ESG score is not significant, while all control variables are.  
7.2.6 The effect of having an ESG score 
We find that firms that are rated with the Refinitiv ESG score on average perform significantly 
better than non-rated firms during the rebound period. In table A.13, column (3), the effect is 
10.9 percentage points of abnormal returns, significant at a .01 level, and in the restricted 
model in column (4), the effect is 8.5 percentage points, significant at a .1 level. During the 
crisis, in colums (1) and (2), we find no effect of being ESG-rated. 
In table A.14 we find several significant relationships when estimating the probability of being 
ESG scored. A one percentage increase in Mcap is associated with a 1.3 percentage point 
increase in the probability of being ESG scored, significant at .01 level. Idiosyncratic, 
AcqIntang, RD_SGA, MktShare and InstOwners also have significant positive effects on the 
probability, whereas Momentum is the only variable with a significant negative effect. In 
unreported results from the panel data model, we find no effect of being ESG-rated during any 
of the periods.  
7.3 Results from the Panel Data Model 
7.3.1 ESG scores from Refinitiv 
In table 8, the results from model 2 with ESG scores from Refinitiv are presented. The results 
from all six columns suggest that the ESG score is insignificant in explaining abnormal returns 
during ordinary times. The interaction term ESG:Crisis is also insignificant in all six columns, 
which indicates that the effect of the ESG does not change during the crisis period. However, 
the interaction term ESG:Rebound is significant with a coefficient of -.001 in all six columns,  
significant at .05 level in column (6). This indicates that when increasing the ESG score by 1 
point, there is a significant difference of -0.1 percentage points in the effect on abnormal 
returns, when comparing ordinary times to the rebound period. The F-test for the joint 
hypothesis of ESG and ESG:Rebound is significant at a .1 level in all 6 specifications, which 





Table 8: Model 2 with ESG scores from Refinitiv 
Table 8 presents the results from regressing abnormal returns on the Refinitiv ESG score and 
the control variables for the panel data sample. In column (1), we regress abnormal returns on 
the ESG score combined with ESG interaction terms for the crisis- and the rebound period. In 
column (2), we add the Fama-French + momentum factor loadings. In column (3), we add 
more market-based measures of risk. In column (4), we add the accounting-based variables. 
In column (5), we regress the abnormal returns on the complete model 2. In column (6), we 
regress abnormal returns on the restricted model. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ESG -0.001 -0.001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.00001 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) 
Mkt_RF_Loading  -0.003 0.006 0.013** 0.014** 0.012* 
  (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) 
HML_Loading  0.006 0.005 0.007* 0.007* 0.005* 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
WML_Loading  -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.004  
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)  
SMB_Loading  0.002 0.009** 0.008 0.008  
  (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005)  
BTM   0.019** 0.004 0.004  
   (0.007) (0.010) (0.010)  
BTMneg   -0.038 -0.043 -0.044  
   (0.052) (0.058) (0.059)  
Momentum   0.046 0.045 0.045 0.044 
   (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Idiosyncratic   -0.267* -0.477*** -0.483*** -0.407*** 
   (0.134) (0.135) (0.138) (0.112) 
Cash    -0.005 -0.004  
    (0.035) (0.035)  
LT_Debt    0.006 0.007 -0.009 
    (0.035) (0.035) (0.029) 
ST_Debt    0.016 0.018  
    (0.050) (0.051)  
ROA    -0.005 -0.003 -0.013 
    (0.050) (0.050) (0.049) 
Loss    0.001 0.002  
    (0.007) (0.007)  
InvTurn    -0.005 -0.005  
    (0.003) (0.003)  
AcqIntang    0.040 0.041 0.034 
    (0.026) (0.026) (0.025) 
RD_SGA    0.006 0.006  
    (0.004) (0.004)  
log(Mcap)    -0.018** -0.018** -0.020*** 
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    (0.008) (0.008) (0.005) 
DivPayout    -0.0001 -0.0001  
    (0.0002) (0.0002)  
MktShare     -0.139  
     (0.296)  
Inst_Owners     -0.0001 -0.0001 
     (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ESG:Crisis 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
ESG:Rebound -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** -0.001* -0.001* -0.001** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Joint Hypothesis Rebound -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* -0.001* 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 9,357 9,357 9,357 9,357 9,357 9,357 
Adjusted R2 -0.025 -0.024 0.021 0.028 0.028 0.026 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Disaggregated ESG scores 
In table A.11 we show that none of the disaggregated scores have a significant effect during 
ordinary times or during the crisis. Only the environmental scores are negatively associated 
with abnormal returns during the rebound period. In column (1) a 1-point increase in the 
environmental score is associated with a .1 percentage point reduction in monthly abnormal 
returns. The F-test for the joint hypothesis of Refinitiv_ENSCORE and 
Refinitiv_ENSCORE:Rebound is significant at a .01 level.  
7.3.2 ESG scores from Sustainalytics 
In table A.12, we run model 2 with ESG scores from Sustainalytics. In all six columns, the 






In this section, we will connect our results to the theory and literature review and discuss the 
implications. We begin by discussing the crisis period, then relevant control variables will be 
addressed briefly, in the context of the market sentiment, before the rebound is discussed. 
Thereafter, we will acknowledge the limitations of our results. Indications of sampling bias 
will be discussed in the limitations section. 
8.1 The crisis period 
None of the results from the models run on the crisis period indicate a significant relationship 
between ESG and stock market performance. Our findings are robust to all the robustness 
tests, and we detect no differential effect of ESG between countries or ESG quartiles. For the 
firms with Sustainalytics ESG scores, the relationship between ESG and performance is 
somewhat more resilient to the addition of control variables, but nonetheless insignificant in 
the full- and restricted models. Thus, the findings point in the direction of a neutral relationship 
between ESG and stock market performance for the first part of the COVID-19 Nordic stock 
market. This is in contrast with the positive relationship found in Albuquerque et al.’s (2020) 
and Ding et al.’s (2020) studies, which we believe is due to possible omitted variable bias in 
their studies. By disaggregating the ESG score and only focusing on the environmental and 
social dimensions, such as Albuquerque et al. (2020), we still find no significance.  
The neutral relationship between ESG and stock market performance is in line with the studies 
of Takahashi and Yamada (2020) and Demers et al. (2020), despite geographical differences. 
When we run various specifications of model 1 on the crisis period, ESG's significance 
diminishes very quickly. This indicates that in the Nordic region, the ESG score itself is poorly 
correlated with the abnormal return during the crisis period. Compared with Demers et al.’s 
(2020) findings, the relationship between ESG and stock performance is even less robust to 
the addition of control variables. 
Model 2 indicates that there is no significant relationship between ESG and stock market 
performance during ordinary times, which is consistent with previous research from Revelli 
and Viviani (2015), Friede et al. (2015), and Sargis and Wang (2020). Furthermore, there is 
no indication that the effect of the ESG score is different during the crisis period compared to 
normal times, consistent with the results from our model 1. This non-differential effect of ESG 
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during the crisis period contrasts with Lins et al.'s (2017) findings. The authors found a 
significant change in the effect of CSR on abnormal returns during the financial crisis, 
compared with the periods before and after the crisis. Our deviating results may be due to the 
origin of the crises. The financial crisis arose endogenously from banks and financial 
institutions, which makes Lins et al. (2017) suggest that the social capital generated by CSR 
activities will pay off when trust in the economy suddenly declines. A similar trust issue might 
not be considered relevant in the COVID-19 crisis, which was triggered by an exogenous non-
economic factor. Therefore, it may well be assumed that involvement in the ESG factors 
provides less protection in the covid-19 stock market compared to the financial crisis in 2008-
2009. 
In the context of Shareholder theory, the neutral effect does not necessarily mean that ESG 
investments harm shareholders. On the other hand, if additional shareholder value could be 
created by reallocating the resources spent on ESG-related activities, this indicates that ESG 
possibly destroys shareholder value indirectly, through the opportunity cost. Hence, if the 
shareholders are to be regarded as the sole principal, a principal-agent problem arises between 
shareholders and management. However, if such a misallocation exists and is known to 
shareholders, it should be reflected in reduced stock market performance as a consequence of 
ESG, which did not happen during the crisis. Moreover, when approaching the findings using 
the Stakeholder theory, the neutral effect indicates that the firms successfully maintain the 
interests of multiple stakeholders. Further, if one regards the stakeholders as the principal, this 
does not indicate the presence of a principal-agent problem, because the managers appear to 
act in the interests of the stakeholders. If investors are aware of a misallocation of resources 
and do not punish the stock price, a neutral relationship between ESG and performance 
suggests that the investors act in accordance with the Stakeholder theory, valuing more than 
just returns.  
Despite a dramatic change in market sentiment, the relationship between ESG and stock 
market performance remained the same during the crisis as in ordinary times. Consequently, 
we find no indication of an insurance effect associated with ESG, and this indicates that the 




8.2 The change in market sentiment  
 
We consider the change in sentiment an integral part of understanding the different ESG 
effects in the two periods. While the sentiment during the crisis did not coincide with a change 
in the ESG effect compared to ordinary times, the opposite was the case during the rebound. 
Further, we believe indications of the change in investor sentiment can be found in several of 
the control variables. Namely, in the differences between the significant variables in the crisis- 
and rebound periods. Consequently, we will address this before discussing the rebound. Apart 
from this, we do not find a thorough discussion of the control variables relevant to the thesis. 
As shown in Table 6, long-term debt is negatively associated with abnormal returns during the 
crisis period, while return on assets contributes positively. This is consistent with the long line 
of literature that states low borrowing and profitability are crucial for a stock's performance 
through a period of crisis. During the rebound, these are no longer important determinants of 
returns, which indicates a change in market sentiment. Furthermore, market cap contributes 
positively during the crisis. However, the variable is not significant during the rebound, and 
this indicates that investors seek safety in firm size during the crisis, but not during the 
rebound. Finally, the proportion of institutional investors proves to be of importance and has 
a significant, slightly negative effect on abnormal returns during the crisis period. This 
negative effect may indicate that institutional investors are better informed and engaged in 
short selling. In contrast, the effect changes to a positive one during the shorter rebound period. 
Again, this indicates a shift to a more bullish sentiment. 
In sum, the aforementioned changes in the effects of control variables postulate the transition 
to a more bullish market sentiment in the rebound period, in line with the movements of the 
VIX and the report from SEB (2020). 
8.3 The rebound period 
Our findings show that a 1-point increase in ESG leads to a decrease in BHAR of .3 percentage 
points on average. This indicates that ESG is negatively associated with returns during the 
rebound period. 
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When reducing the scope of the rebound period to last until April 29, the models show that the 
effect might have been even more robust. This indicates that the relationship between ESG 
and stock market performance was more prominent during the first 5 weeks of the rebound. 
This is confirmed by the results from the ESG score quartiles, where the firms in the top two 
quartiles significantly underperformed compared with those in the lowest quartile of ESG 
scores. For the models with disaggregated ESG score, the social score is not significant, 
suggesting that the Environmental and Governmental dimensions are the ones explaining the 
negative relationship between aggregated ESG score and stock market performance during the 
first 5 weeks of the rebound.  
In model 2 we find that the effect of ESG differs negatively during the rebound period 
compared to ordinary times, confirming the findings from Model 1. In addition, we find 
evidence that the effect is negative when regarding the rebound period independently. The 
model indicates a negative effect of .1 percentage points of returns per point of ESG score 
during the rebound, compared to normal times, as well as during the rebound independently. 
Compared to model 1, this is a smaller effect. Some of this difference might be caused by the 
fact that the rebound period of model 2 does not capture the first part of the rebound, which 
happened in March. As shown, the ESG effect might have been most robust during the first 
part of the rebound. Nonetheless, some of the difference might be due to factors that are 
unobserved in model 1. 
The Sustainalytics sample indicates a neutral effect of ESG during the rebound period. Again, 
model 2 confirms the results from model 1, while also finding no differential effect of ESG in 
either the crisis period or the rebound period using Sustainalytics scores. When we run a model 
with Refinitiv ESG scores on the same sample (72 companies), we get a corresponding neutral 
effect. Therefore, we find it reasonable to assume that the neutral effect is due to sample 
differences, rather than the different ESG scores, and that if Sustainalytics had rated the same 
firms as Reuters, the models run on the sample of Sustainalytics-rated firms would have given 
results similar to those of the Refinitiv sample.  
The findings point in the direction of a negative relationship between ESG and stock market 
performance during the rebound period of the COVID-19 stock market. Especially for the 
firms in the two upper quartiles of ESG scores, and during the first 5 weeks of the rebound. 
Among the literature reviewed, only Demers et al. (2020) consider the rebound period of the 




and stock market performance, in line with our results. This might be expected, due to the 
similarities in methodology, and also indicates that there are no geographical differences in 
the relationship between ESG and stock market performance between the Nordics and the 
United States. 
The results from model 2 with disaggregated ESG scores suggest that the negative relationship 
can be explained by the environmental dimension, but not the other two dimensions. In the 
context of Hoepner et al.’s (2016) findings, this suggests that the possible downside risk 
protection offered by engaging in the environmental dimension may have come at a cost to 
stock market performance during the rebound. 
The negative effect during the rebound can be discussed in the context of Agency Theory and 
the principal-agent problem that arises when the managers invest in ESG on behalf of the 
shareholders. Accordingly, it indicates that management might have other reasons to invest in 
ESG, or that they simply consider ESG investments profitable and are oblivious to the possible 
downside shown in our results. In addition, the negative effect of ESG is supported by the 
Shareholder theory, in the way that the ESG investments probably target other stakeholders, 
but come at the cost of the shareholders. Thus, according to the Agency Theory and the 
Shareholder Theory, the resources spent on ESG investments and activities might not be 
allocated optimally. Nonetheless, we find it unlikely that such fundamental mechanisms 
changed during the transition from crisis to rebound, and therefore turn to other explanations. 
In the market sentiment that was prominent during the rebound period, many investors were 
seeking returns by leaving safe stocks in favor of riskier ones. If the Prospect theory holds, it 
will reason the abandonment of the firms with high ESG scores in such a market, since these 
firms have lower total and idiosyncratic risk4, when compared to those with a lower ESG score 
(Sassen et al., 2016). Therefore, we believe the change in sentiment might have contributed to 
the relative reduction of stock market performance during the rebound period. The negative 
effect also corresponds with the findings of Lys et al. (2015), suggesting that investors lost 
faith in the ESG-related signals of future performance. Although, based on their study, one 
 
4 In our sample, idiosyncratic risk is negatively correlated with ESG. See A.2. 
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might have expected to find the same effect during the crisis. Consequently, it is possible that 
a delayed effect is captured during the rebound.  
The indicated overperformance by ESG-rated firms compared to unrated firms suggests that 
it is not random if a firm is rated or not. The rated firms might possess qualities that strengthen 
them during the rebound. Such qualities can be size, market share and institutional ownership, 
as indicated by our linear probability model for the probability of being ESG-rated. 
Ultimately, when regarding the Nordic COVID-19 stock market as a whole, we believe that 
the relationship between ESG and performance is much in line with stakeholder theory, while 
the negative relationship during the rebound was caused by a bullish market sentiment. From 
our results, it seems evident that ESG offered no downside protection. Although we find a 
neutral to negative relationship between ESG and stock market performance, we do not know 
the long-term effect of ESG investments for our sample firms. Hence, the negative effect 
associated with the rebound might be more than compensated by future earnings.  
Ceteris paribus, the corresponding neutral and negative effects found in models 1 and 2 
indicate that, despite the flexibility of panel data, model 1 is a robust model for explaining the 
ESG effect for the isolated periods. This might suggest that the factors unobserved in model 1 
are not important determinants of abnormal returns when regarding the crisis and rebound 
independently. Nonetheless, model 2 sheds light on the differentiated effect of ESG on stock 
market performance in the COVID-19 stock market and during ordinary times. 
8.4 Limitations and implications for further research 
There are important limitations in our thesis that should be mentioned. A crucial element is 
the sample size, being limited by the coverage of ESG scores, relative to the total number of 
Nordic firms. This is especially prominent in the Sustainalytics sample, where the limited 
number of firms forces us to reduce the number of control variables due to multicollinearity 
and possible overfitting when applying models to this sample. Thus, a more extensive 
coverage of Nordic firms would improve the quality of our models. 
Due to the large variation among providers of ESG scores, it would have been beneficial to 
use ESG scores from other agencies to investigate the consistency of the results. Although, in 




scores. We therefore recommend that further research use ESG scores from different providers 
and perform comparative analyzes. Nonetheless, as discussed in section 5.3, there are several 
weaknesses associated with the use of the ESG score as a proxy for sustainability. 
Consequently, it might be optimal to independently analyze the sustainability of the Nordic 
firms, rather than just relying on ESG scores as a proxy. The isolation and analysis of the 
firms’ ESG-related investments and the discussion of their profitability might also be 
informative. 
Further, it is important to highlight that during the rebound period, the 188 ESG-rated firms 
performed better than the 532 unrated ones, although the effect of being rated is neutral during 
the crisis. This is not confirmed by the panel data model, suggesting that the effect might be 
due to factors that are unobserved in the cross-sectional model. In addition, there are several 
significant relationships explaining the probability of a firm being ESG-rated. This implies 
that the rating agencies’ selection process is not random, thus leading to a sampling bias in our 
samples of rated firms. It also emphasizes the fact that our results only apply to firms with 
ESG scores, and that had all 720 firms been rated, our results may have been different. Thus, 
further research should investigate the factors that explain if a firm is ESG-rated or not.  
In addition, model 2 is based on active companies and might suffer from survivorship bias. 
This means that the stocks used in the analysis are viewed as a representative comprehensive 
sample, without regarding those that are delisted for various reasons, i.e., bankruptcy. The 
consequence of survivorship bias is often an overestimation of historical performance and may 
impact our findings.  
There are also multiple relevant factors that we have not controlled for. Such as the 
involvement in and sensitivity to international trade and global value chains, as is previously 
done for US firms (Ramelli & Wagner, 2020), and management turnover, addressing the 
principal-agent problem. Our use of industry- and country fixed effects capture many variables 
that could perhaps be better analyzed independently, such as COVID-19 infection numbers 
and fiscal and monetary policies. This implies that future research should control for the 
variables that we did not, and further analyze the Nordic COVID-19 stock market and control 
for other important drivers. We also believe that the extension of our methods to Nordic firms 
during the financial crisis would contribute to the understanding of the ESG-effect. 
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Finally, the Nordic region's leading position in ESG integration may suggest that most firms 
in our sample are relatively sustainable, in a global context. This means that the real effect of 
ESG would not necessarily have been negative for Nordic firms during the rebound, when 






The thesis analyzes the effect of ESG on stock market performance for Nordic firms during 
the COVID-19 stock market, and whether ESG acted as a resilience factor. We examine the 
relationship using BHAR models for the crisis- and rebound periods, as well as fixed effects 
models on a panel data ranging from 2015, while controlling for an array of variables based 
on literature and theory. We find no evidence of a positive relationship between ESG and stock 
market performance for Nordic firms during the COVID-19 stock market. Neither when 
analyzing the period independently or when comparing it to ordinary times, and the results are 
robust to all of our robustness tests. On the contrary, there is evidence of a negative relationship 
between ESG and stock market performance during the rebound period. Both when analyzing 
the period independently, and when comparing the rebound period to normal times. We 
believe this was caused by a change in market sentiment, which led to the abandonment of 
firms with high ESG scores. Furthermore, this indicates that investors might have regarded 
ESG as less profitable during the steep bull market.  
Our findings also suggest that all three disaggregate ESG dimensions might have impacted 
stock performance negatively during the rebound, but that the impact of the Environmental 
dimension was the most robust.  In addition, we find indications that the negative effect was 
more severe for the firms with ESG scores in the upper two quartiles, and that the effect was 
most robust in the early stage of the rebound. We believe that the lack of support of the 
negative relationship from the Sustainalytics models is due to sample differences, rather than 
the nature of the ESG scores. Our findings are somewhat in line with research on the US market 
(Demers et al., 2020), but shed new light on the effect of ESG in the Nordic stock market. The 
results only apply to 188 Nordic firms with ESG scores, due to the rating agencies’ inadequate 
coverage, and we regard this as the main weakness of our thesis. Further, we make several 
suggestions for future research, and we especially recommend an exploration of the effect of 
being ESG-rated and the factors that explain if a firm is rated, as well as the use of different 
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A.1: Composition of variables 
AcqIntang: Intangible assets / total assets. Compustat items INTAN/AT. 
BHAR: Buy-and hold abnormal returns estimated using the Market Model. Betas estimated 
using a 60-month estimation window. 
BTM: Book to market. Book value of equity / market value of equity. Compustat items CEQ 
and CSHOI and Datastream item PT. BTM = CEQ(PT*CSHOI). 
BTMneg: Dummy variable with the value “1” if BTM is negative. 
Cash: Cash and short-term investments / total assets. Compustat items CHE/AT. 
DivPayout: Dividend payout ratio. Dividends/net income. Compustat items DV/NICON. 
ESG: Thomas Reuters Refinitiv ESG Score. 
ESG_Sustainalytics: Sustainalytics ESG Score. 
HML_Loading: The factor loading on Kenneth French’s high minus low factor for European 
firms. Estimated using a 60-month estimation window. 
Idiosyncratic: Idiosyncratic risk. The residual standard deviation estimated using a 60-month 
estimation window. 
Inst_Owners: Percentage of shares outstanding held by institutional shareholders. Bloomberg 
item EQY_INST_PCT_SH_OUT. 
InvTurn: Inventory turnover ratio. Cost of goods sold/total inventories. Compustat items 
COGS/INVT. Set to zero if missing.  
Loss: Dummy variable with the value “1” if ROA is negative. 
LT_Debt: Long-term debt. Long-term debt/total assets. Compustat items DLTT/AT. 
Mcap: Log-transformed market cap. Compustat item CSHOI and Datastream item PT. Mcap 
= CSHOI*PT. 
Mkt_RF_Loading: The factor loading on Kenneth French’s market factor for European firms. 
Estimated using a 60-month estimation window. 
MktShare: Market share. Sales/total industry sales. Compustat item SALE/sim(Sale_i), where 
i = 2-digit SIC. 
WML_Loading: The factor loading on Kenneth French’s momentum factor for European 
firms. Estimated using a 60-month estimation window. 
Momentum: Rolling, raw buy-and-hold returns of the past 12 months. 
 72
RD_SGA: Stock-transformed R&D and one-third of SG&A. Calculated using a 5-year 
amortization period. Compustat items XRD + 1/3*XSGA amortized over 5 years, divided by 
total assets. When data is missing, we assume the last available R&D and SG&A expense to 
be constant for the prior years. 
ROA: Return on assets. Net income/total assets. Compustat items NICON/AT. 
SMB_Loading: The factor loading on Kenneth French’s small minus big factor for European 
firms. Estimated using a 60-month estimation window. 
























A.2: Correlation Matrix 
The main sample for Model 1, 188 firms with Reuters Refinitiv ESG score during the crisis. 
 ESG Loss BTMneg 
Inst_ 








Loading Idiosyncratic DivPayout Mcap MktShare BTM Momentum InvTurn 
ESG                      
Loss -0.18*                      
BTMneg  0.10  -0.04                     
Inst_Owners  0.18*  -0.15*  -0.05                    
Cash -0.19**   0.29*** -0.02  -0.08                   
LTDebt  0.01  -0.01   0.36***  0.03  -0.40***                 
STDebt -0.16*   0.10   0.00  -0.10  -0.24**   0.14*                 
ROA  0.15*  -0.63***  0.13   0.11  -0.44***  0.01  -0.09                
AcqIntang -0.17*  -0.08  -0.09   0.22**  -0.29***  0.16*   0.11   0.07               
RD_SGA -0.14   0.25*** -0.05  -0.21**   0.42*** -0.30*** -0.12  -0.33*** -0.14              
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.11   0.00   0.00   0.12   0.08  -0.03   0.01   0.12  -0.05   0.03             
SMB_Loading -0.40***  0.42*** -0.04  -0.17*   0.60*** -0.18*   0.01  -0.44*** -0.03   0.33***  0.09            
HML_Loading  0.31*** -0.18*   0.01   0.20**  -0.18*   0.01  -0.05   0.23**   0.00  -0.09   0.74*** -0.46***          
WML_Loading -0.26***  0.20**  -0.06  -0.15*   0.13  -0.04  -0.01  -0.24***  0.08   0.09  -0.68***  0.42*** -0.78***         
Idiosyncratic -0.43***  0.48*** -0.04  -0.20**   0.54*** -0.17*   0.03  -0.47***  0.01   0.37***  0.03   0.95*** -0.48***  0.46***        
DivPayout  0.08  -0.23**  -0.02   0.04   0.01  -0.08   0.04   0.00  -0.06   0.04   0.04  -0.04   0.01  -0.07  -0.06        
Mcap  0.49*** -0.18*   0.06   0.01  -0.04  -0.10  -0.15*   0.20**  -0.14  -0.12  -0.03  -0.35***  0.25*** -0.18*  -0.39***  0.09       
MktShare  0.32*** -0.16*   0.07   0.00  -0.22**   0.21**   0.06   0.13  -0.07  -0.18*  -0.10  -0.33***  0.11  -0.11  -0.34***  0.01   0.42***     
BTM  0.22**  -0.05  -0.09   0.06  -0.16*   0.04   0.01  -0.02  -0.07  -0.19**   0.01  -0.08   0.01  -0.01  -0.07   0.14  -0.14   0.11     
Momentum -0.06  -0.07   0.04   0.11   0.08  -0.12  -0.09   0.25***  0.04  -0.20**   0.10  -0.09   0.17*  -0.10  -0.11  -0.20**   0.07  -0.05  -0.21**    
InvTurn -0.04  -0.12   0.00   0.07  -0.02  -0.01  -0.08   0.11   0.02  -0.13  -0.06   0.00  -0.06   0.00  -0.05   0.08  -0.07   0.06   0.06   0.24***  
BHAR  0.20**  -0.13   0.01  -0.13   0.12  -0.34*** -0.11   0.25*** -0.21**   0.06   0.34***  0.05   0.21**  -0.20**  -0.02   0.00   0.29*** -0.06  -0.04   0.08  -0.01  
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The secondary sample model 1, 72 firms with Sustainalytics ESG scores during the crisis. 
 ESG_S Loss BTMneg 
Inst_ 








Loading Idiosyncratic DivPayout Mcap 
Mkt 
Share BTM Momentum 
Inv 
Turn 
ESG_S                      
Loss -0.11                      
BTMneg  0.00  -0.05                     
Inst_Owners  0.09   0.02  -0.11                    
Cash -0.18   0.04  -0.02  -0.08                   
LTDebt -0.07   0.00   0.59*** -0.01  -0.32**                  
STDebt -0.21   0.12   0.02  -0.09  -0.27*   0.31**                 
ROA  0.05  -0.54***  0.22   0.10   0.23  -0.18  -0.21                
AcqIntang -0.31**   0.02  -0.11   0.09  -0.15   0.19   0.24*  -0.16               
RD_SGA -0.07  -0.05  -0.07  -0.09   0.27*  -0.16  -0.12   0.10   0.08              
Mkt_RF_Loading  0.26*   0.12   0.00   0.10   0.01  -0.12   0.04   0.03  -0.13  -0.04             
SMB_Loading -0.49***  0.55*** -0.02  -0.28*   0.23   0.02   0.29*  -0.35**   0.11   0.05   0.13            
HML_Loading  0.44*** -0.19  -0.02   0.16  -0.11  -0.11  -0.16   0.15  -0.08  -0.07   0.72*** -0.47***          
WML_Loading -0.49***  0.21  -0.08  -0.22  -0.02   0.10   0.16  -0.22   0.20  -0.04  -0.65***  0.44*** -0.76***         
Idiosyncratic -0.56***  0.54*** -0.01  -0.28*   0.21   0.03   0.30*  -0.37**   0.17   0.05   0.04   0.98*** -0.51***  0.49***        
DivPayout  0.01  -0.14  -0.04  -0.14   0.06  -0.06   0.03  -0.13   0.01   0.21  -0.09   0.10  -0.17   0.04   0.09        
Mcap  0.46*** -0.25*  -0.02   0.02   0.13  -0.09  -0.22   0.16  -0.17  -0.07  -0.03  -0.44***  0.28*  -0.22  -0.49***  0.11       
MktShare  0.34**  -0.14   0.07   0.07  -0.16   0.11  -0.01   0.07  -0.08  -0.03  -0.11  -0.39***  0.12  -0.14  -0.39***  0.05   0.56***     
BTM  0.17   0.09  -0.15   0.00  -0.25*  -0.10  -0.02  -0.16  -0.09  -0.18   0.16   0.03   0.06  -0.08   0.04   0.13  -0.28*   0.02     
Momentum -0.12  -0.16   0.08   0.10   0.23  -0.19  -0.09   0.43*** -0.09  -0.28*   0.08  -0.12   0.18  -0.05  -0.11  -0.29*   0.15  -0.03  -0.17    
InvTurn -0.08  -0.04   0.02   0.19  -0.08   0.08   0.00  -0.08   0.03   0.00  -0.01  -0.01  -0.06  -0.11  -0.02   0.20  -0.10   0.20   0.27*  -0.17   




Table A.1: Crisis and rebound period with CAR 
Table A.1 shows the results from regressing CAR on the Refinitiv ESG score and the control 
variables from the restricted models. Column (1) represents the crisis period and column (2) 




 Dependent variable: 
 CAR 
 (1) (2) 
ESG -0.001 -0.002** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.270*** -0.171*** 
 (0.045) (0.036) 
HML_Loading -0.054***  
 (0.017)  
LTDebt -0.358***  
 (0.100)  
ROA 0.242**  
 (0.109)  
Momentum  0.045 
  (0.038) 
Cash  0.234** 
  (0.112) 
BTMneg  0.163 
  (0.174) 
AcqIntang -0.077 0.230** 
 (0.072) (0.092) 
log(Mcap) 0.048***  
 (0.014)  
DivPayout  0.001 
  (0.001) 
Inst_Owners -0.002*** 0.0004 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -0.567** 0.053 
 (0.226) (0.203) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 
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Table A.2: The crisis period with disaggregated ESG scores 
Table A.2 presents the results from regressing BHAR on the disaggregated Refinitiv ESG 
scores and the control variables from the restricted model. In column (1), we only include the 
environmental score, in column (2) we only include the social score, and in column (3) we only 
include the governance score.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Refinitiv.ENSCORE -0.00004   
 (0.001)   
Refinitiv.SOSCORE  -0.0005  
  (0.001)  
Refinitiv.CGSCORE   -0.0001 
   (0.0004) 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.202*** 0.202*** 0.202*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) (0.031) 
HML_Loading -0.036*** -0.035*** -0.036*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) 
LTDebt -0.223*** -0.220*** -0.222*** 
 (0.070) (0.070) (0.070) 
ROA 0.247*** 0.246*** 0.243*** 
 (0.076) (0.076) (0.077) 
AcqIntang -0.057 -0.063 -0.057 
 (0.051) (0.051) (0.051) 
log(Mcap) 0.029*** 0.032*** 0.030*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) 
Inst_Owners -0.002*** -0.001*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) 
Constant -0.418*** -0.432*** -0.418*** 
 (0.159) (0.157) (0.156) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 
Adjusted R2 0.527 0.529 0.527 





Table A.3: The rebound period with disaggregated ESG scores 
Table A.3 presents the results from regressing BHAR on the disaggregated Refinitiv ESG 
scores and the control variables from the restricted model. In column (1), we only include the 
environmental score, in column (2) we only include the social score and in column (3) we only 
include the governance score.  
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Refinitiv.ENSCORE -0.002**   
 (0.001)   
Refinitiv.SOSCORE  -0.002*  
  (0.001)  
Refinitiv.CGSCORE   -0.002* 
   (0.001) 
Mkt_RF_Loading -0.249*** -0.251*** -0.258*** 
 (0.053) (0.053) (0.053) 
Momentum 0.081 0.079 0.072 
 (0.055) (0.056) (0.056) 
Cash 0.253 0.322* 0.361** 
 (0.170) (0.165) (0.163) 
BTMneg 0.124 0.149 0.166 
 (0.252) (0.256) (0.258) 
AcqIntang 0.323** 0.326** 0.377*** 
 (0.135) (0.136) (0.133) 
DivPayout 0.002 0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inst_Owners 0.001 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.001 0.006 -0.028 
 (0.295) (0.299) (0.296) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 
Adjusted R2 0.372 0.365 0.364 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A.4: Crisis and rebound period: Differences between countries 
Table A.4 presents the results from regressing BHAR on Refinitiv ESG scores, the control 
variables from the restricted models and interaction terms between countries and ESG.  Column 
(1) represents the results from the crisis period and column (2) represents the results from the 
rebound period. 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) 
ESG -0.0002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.205*** -0.239*** 
 (0.032) (0.053) 
HML_Loading -0.039***  
 (0.012)  
LTDebt -0.218***  
 (0.070)  
ROA 0.237***  
 (0.076)  
Momentum  0.078 
  (0.057) 
Cash  0.298* 
  (0.164) 
BTMneg  0.201 
  (0.255) 
AcqIntang -0.060 0.333** 
 (0.051) (0.134) 
log(Mcap) 0.034***  
 (0.010)  
DivPayout  0.002 
  (0.001) 
Inst_Owners -0.002*** 0.001 
 (0.0005) (0.001) 
Denmark -0.060 0.174 
 (0.104) (0.259) 
Finland 0.196** -0.316 
 (0.092) (0.223) 
Norway -0.039 0.130 
 (0.085) (0.206) 
ESG:Denmark -0.0004 -0.004 
 (0.002) (0.005) 
ESG:Finland -0.002 0.002 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
ESG:Norway 0.001 -0.004 
 (0.001) (0.004) 
Constant -0.363** -0.017 
 (0.165) (0.313) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 




Adjusted R2 0.531 0.376 




Table A.5: The crisis and rebound period with ESG scores by quartile 
Table A.5 presents the results from regressing BHAR on the Refinitiv ESG score by quartiles 
and the control variables from the restricted models. Column (1) represents the results from the 
crisis period and column (2) represents the results from the rebound period. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) 
ESG_Quartile_2 -0.033 0.073 
 (0.027) (0.066) 
ESG_Quartile_3 -0.026 -0.053 
 (0.031) (0.074) 
ESG_Quartile_4 -0.027 -0.093 
 (0.035) (0.074) 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.201*** -0.246*** 
 (0.031) (0.054) 
HML_Loading -0.035***  
 (0.012)  
LTDebt -0.216***  
 (0.070)  
ROA 0.255***  
 (0.076)  
Momentum  0.075 
  (0.056) 
Cash  0.365** 
  (0.166) 
BTMneg  0.179 
  (0.256) 
AcqIntang -0.054 0.341** 
 (0.051) (0.134) 
log(Mcap) 0.031***  
 (0.010)  
DivPayout  0.002 
  (0.001) 
Inst_Owners -0.001*** 0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.001) 
Constant -0.438*** -0.090 
 (0.165) (0.291) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 
Adjusted R2 0.525 0.371 






Table A.6: Shorter rebound period with Refinitiv ESG score 
Table A.6 presents the results from regressing BHAR on the Refinitiv ESG score and the 
control variables for the shorter rebound period sample. In column (1), we only regress 
BHAR on the ESG score. In column (2), we add country- and industry fixed effects. In 
column (3), we add the Fama-French + momentum factor loadings. In column (4), we add 
more market-based measures of risk. We remove the SMB-Factor loading due to issues with 
multicollinearity. In column (5), we add the accounting-based variables. In column (6), we 




 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
ESG -0.004*** -0.002** -0.002** -0.002* -0.002* -0.003** -0.003** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mkt_RF_Loading   -0.242*** -0.254*** -0.204** -0.204** -0.181*** 
   (0.079) (0.072) (0.080) (0.078) (0.036) 
HML_Loading   0.028 0.030 0.019 0.017  
   (0.028) (0.026) (0.028) (0.028)  
WML_Loading   -0.056 -0.077 -0.068 -0.057  
   (0.119) (0.122) (0.122) (0.120)  
SMB_Loading   0.142     
   (0.170)     
BTM    -0.017 -0.046 -0.035  
    (0.042) (0.044) (0.043)  
BTMneg    0.185 0.412** 0.475** 0.369** 
    (0.182) (0.204) (0.202) (0.173) 
Momentum    0.038 0.048 0.050 0.046 
    (0.040) (0.044) (0.044) (0.038) 
Idiosyncratic    1.011 0.170 0.327  
    (0.773) (0.940) (0.926)  
Cash     0.050 0.048 0.304*** 
     (0.166) (0.163) (0.112) 
LTDebt     -0.212 -0.205  
     (0.155) (0.152)  
STDebt     -0.607* -0.530  
     (0.329) (0.325)  
ROA     -0.314 -0.331*  
     (0.196) (0.193)  
Loss     0.014 0.014  
     (0.063) (0.062)  
InvTurn     -0.0004 -0.002  
     (0.014) (0.013)  
AcqIntang     0.203** 0.170* 0.169* 
     (0.098) (0.098) (0.091) 
RD_SGA     -0.030 -0.008  
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     (0.070) (0.069)  
log(Mcap)     -0.002 0.002  
     (0.018) (0.018)  
DivPayout     0.002** 0.002** 0.002* 
     (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Inst_Owners      0.002** 0.002** 
      (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.341*** 0.072 0.022 -0.022 0.129 0.060 -0.027 
 (0.051) (0.222) (0.220) (0.222) (0.302) (0.298) (0.202) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 188 188 
Adjusted R2 0.095 0.186 0.271 0.275 0.318 0.341 0.349 






Table A.7: Shorter rebound period: Robustness tests 
Table A.7 presents several robustness tests for the shorter rebound period sample. In all 
columns, we include the control variables from the restricted models. Column (1) – (3) show 
the results from regressing BHAR on the disaggregated Refinitiv ESG scores. In column (4), 
BHAR is regressed on the interactions between the Refinitiv ESG score and the countries. 
Column (5) shows the results from regressing BHAR on the Refinitiv ESG score by quartiles. 
In column (6), BHAR is regressed on Sustainalytics’ ESG score. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Refinitiv.ENSCORE -0.002**      
 (0.001)      
Refinitiv.SOSCORE  -0.001     
  (0.001)     
Refinitiv.CGSCORE   -0.002***    
   (0.001)    
ESG    -0.002*   
    (0.001)   
ESG_Quartile_2     -0.005  
     (0.045)  
ESG_Quartile_3     -0.085*  
     (0.050)  
ESG_Quartile_4     -0.111**  
     (0.050)  
Mkt_RF_Loading -0.180*** -0.183*** -0.187*** -0.176*** -0.175***  
 (0.036) (0.036) (0.035) (0.036) (0.037)  
Momentum 0.052 0.051 0.040 0.052 0.050  
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.039) (0.038)  
Cash 0.274** 0.333*** 0.349*** 0.296*** 0.329***  
 (0.117) (0.113) (0.109) (0.112) (0.113)  
ESG_Sustainalytics      0.001 
      (0.001) 
HML_Loading      -0.043** 
      (0.020) 
BTMneg 0.321* 0.325* 0.394** 0.385** 0.371** 1.259*** 
 (0.172) (0.176) (0.173) (0.174) (0.175) (0.215) 
ROA      1.057*** 
      (0.284) 
AcqIntang 0.170* 0.182* 0.209** 0.167* 0.181* 0.440*** 
 (0.092) (0.094) (0.089) (0.091) (0.092) (0.115) 
DivPayout 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002*  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
Inst_Owners 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002** 0.002**  
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)  
log(Mcap)      -0.074*** 
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      (0.024) 
Denmark    0.160   
    (0.177)   
Finland    -0.232   
    (0.152)   
Norway    -0.129   
    (0.140)   
ESG:Denmark    -0.004   
    (0.003)   
ESG:Finland    0.002   
    (0.002)   
ESG:Norway    0.00001   
    (0.002)   
Constant -0.063 -0.081 -0.050 0.031 -0.125 -0.086 
 (0.202) (0.206) (0.198) (0.214) (0.199) (0.245) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Observations 188 188 188 188 188 72 
Adjusted R2 0.341 0.325 0.359 0.349 0.342 0.569 






Table A.8: The crisis period with ESG scores from Sustainalytics 
Table A.8 presents the results from regressing BHAR on Sustainalytics’ ESG score and the 
control variables for the crisis sample. In column (1), we regress BHAR only on the ESG score. 
In column (2), we add country- and industry fixed effects. In column (3), we add the Fama-
French + momentum factor loadings. In column (4), we regress BHAR on the complete model 
1. Several variables are removed due to multicollinearity. In column (5), we regress BHAR on 
the restricted model.  
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ESG_Sustainalytics 0.002** 0.001* 0.002 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Mkt_RF_Loading   -0.045 0.053  
   (0.110) (0.041)  
HML_Loading   0.029   
   (0.033)   
WML_Loading   -0.081   
   (0.154)   
SMB_Loading   0.247   
   (0.355)   
Momentum    0.150** 0.133*** 
    (0.057) (0.046) 
Cash    -0.038  
    (0.150)  
LTDebt    0.004  
    (0.151)  
STDebt    0.947** 1.090*** 
    (0.348) (0.299) 
ROA    -0.523* -0.547** 
    (0.276) (0.225) 
Loss    -0.019  
    (0.072)  
AcqIntang    -0.179* -0.246*** 
    (0.090) (0.079) 
RD_SGA    0.162  
    (0.102)  
log(Mcap)    0.052*** 0.045*** 
    (0.018) (0.016) 
DivPayout    -0.0001  
    (0.001)  
Inst_Owners    -0.001  
    (0.001)  
Constant -0.171*** -0.291** -0.467* -0.922*** -0.802*** 
 (0.045) (0.125) (0.251) (0.228) (0.153) 
 86
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.073 0.371 0.344 0.627 0.641 






Table A.9: The rebound period with ESG scores from Sustainalytics 
Table A.9 presents the results from regressing BHAR on Sustainalytics’ ESG score and the 
control variables for the rebound period sample. In column (1), we regress BHAR only on the 
ESG score. In column (2), we add country- and industry fixed effects. In column (3), we add 
the Fama-French + momentum factor loadings. In column (4), we regress the BHAR on the 
complete model 1. Some variables are removed due to multicollinearity. In column (5), we 
regress BHAR on the restricted model.  
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
ESG_Sustainalytics -0.005*** -0.002 -0.001 0.001 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) 
Mkt_RF_Loading   -0.308 -0.352**  
   (0.312) (0.140)  
HML_Loading   -0.001  -0.083** 
   (0.094)  (0.038) 
WML_Loading   0.265   
   (0.437)   
SMB_Loading   0.032   
   (1.007)   
Momentum    -0.206  
    (0.193)  
Cash    0.410  
    (0.509)  
LTDebt    -0.030  
    (0.513)  
STDebt    -2.357*  
    (1.177)  
BTMneg     1.441*** 
     (0.407) 
ROA    2.377** 1.808*** 
    (0.936) (0.537) 
Loss    0.063  
    (0.243)  
AcqIntang    0.821** 0.717*** 
    (0.306) (0.217) 
RD_SGA    -0.402  
    (0.346)  
log(Mcap)    -0.135** -0.121** 
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    (0.062) (0.046) 
DivPayout    0.0002  
    (0.003)  
Inst_Owners    -0.002  
    (0.003)  
Constant 0.505*** -0.182 0.328 1.615** 0.036 
 (0.124) (0.386) (0.711) (0.772) (0.464) 
Industry Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects No Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 72 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.093 0.239 0.335 0.461 0.532 





Table A.10: The crisis- and rebound period with the strict sample  
Table A.10 presents the results from regressing BHAR on a strict sample of firms that have 
been given ESG scores from both Refinitiv and Sustainalytics. In all columns, the control 
variables from the restricted models are included. Columns (1) and (2) show the results from 
the crisis period with ESG scores from Refinitiv and Sustainalytics. Columns (3) and (4) show 




 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ESG 0.002  -0.002  
 (0.001)  (0.004)  
ESG_Sustainalytics  0.001  0.002 
  (0.001)  (0.002) 
Momentum 0.133*** 0.133***   
 (0.044) (0.046)   
STDebt 1.093*** 1.090***   
 (0.292) (0.299)   
HML_Loading   -0.050 -0.083** 
   (0.044) (0.038) 
BTMneg   1.597*** 1.441*** 
   (0.488) (0.407) 
ROA -0.558** -0.547** 2.101*** 1.808*** 
 (0.222) (0.225) (0.735) (0.537) 
AcqIntang -0.249*** -0.246*** 0.802*** 0.717*** 
 (0.078) (0.079) (0.268) (0.217) 
log(Mcap) 0.046*** 0.045*** -0.092* -0.121** 
 (0.014) (0.016) (0.051) (0.046) 
Constant -0.817*** -0.802*** -0.206 0.036 
 (0.152) (0.153) (0.526) (0.464) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes No 
Observations 72 72 72 72 
Adjusted R2 0.649 0.641 0.504 0.532 




Table A.11: Model 2 with disaggregated ESG scores from Refinitiv 
Table A.11 presents the results from the regressions of abnormal returns on the disaggregated 
Refinitiv ESG scores and the control variables from the restricted model 2. In column (1), we 
only include the environmental score, in column (2) we only include the social score, and in 
column (3) we only include the governance score. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Refinitiv_ENSCORE 0.0001   
 (0.0002)   
Refinitiv_SOSCORE  -0.00004  
  (0.0002)  
Refinitiv_CGSCORE   0.00004 
   (0.0001) 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.012* 0.012* 0.012* 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
HML_Loading 0.005* 0.005* 0.005* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Momentum 0.044 0.044 0.044 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) 
Idiosyncratic -0.406*** -0.408*** -0.409*** 
 (0.113) (0.111) (0.111) 
LT_Debt -0.009 -0.008 -0.009 
 (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) 
ROA -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 
 (0.050) (0.049) (0.049) 
AcqIntang 0.034 0.034 0.035 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.025) 
log(Mcap) -0.020*** -0.020*** -0.020*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) 
Inst_Owners -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Refinitiv_ENSCORE:Crisis 0.0005   
 (0.0003)   
Refinitiv_ENSCORE:Rebound -0.001**   
 (0.0003)   
Refinitiv_SOSCORE:Crisis  0.001  
  (0.0004)  
Refinitiv_SOSCORE:Rebound  -0.001  
  (0.0005)  
Refinitiv_CGSCORE:Crisis   0.00003 
   (0.0003) 
Refinitiv_CGSCORE:Rebound   -0.0004 
   (0.0003) 
Joint Hypothesis Rebound -0.001** -0.001 -0.0004 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes 




Observations 9,357 9,357 9,357 
Adjusted R2 0.027 0.026 0.025 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A.12: Model 2 with ESG scores from Sustainalytics 
Table A.12 presents the results from regressing abnormal returns on Sustainalytics’ ESG score 
and the control variables for the panel data sample. In column (1), we regress abnormal returns 
on the ESG score combined with ESG interaction terms for the crisis- and the rebound period. 
In column (2), we add the Fama-French + momentum factor loadings. In column (3), we add 
more market-based measures of risk. In column (4), we add the accounting-based variables. In 
column (5), we regress the abnormal returns on the complete model 2. In column (6), we regress 




 Dependent variable: 
 Abnormal Returns 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
ESG_Sustainalytics -0.0001 -0.0001 0.0001 0.00004 0.00003 0.0001 
 (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) 
Mkt_RF_Loading  0.0003 0.007 0.016* 0.017* 0.020** 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) 
HML_Loading  -0.004 0.001 0.006 0.007 0.006* 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
WML_Loading  0.003 0.008 0.006 0.006  
  (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006)  
SMB_Loading  0.003 0.013*** 0.012*** 0.012**  
  (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)  
BTM   0.023*** -0.002 -0.003  
   (0.006) (0.011) (0.011)  
BTMneg   -0.018 -0.034 -0.035  
   (0.015) (0.019) (0.020)  
Momentum   0.097*** 0.098*** 0.097*** 0.094*** 
   (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Idiosyncratic   -0.303* -0.577** -0.568** -0.485** 
   (0.171) (0.239) (0.239) (0.198) 
Cash    0.013 0.013  
    (0.028) (0.028)  
LT_Debt    0.047 0.047 0.040 
    (0.033) (0.034) (0.029) 
ST_Debt    -0.002 -0.0002  
    (0.061) (0.063)  
ROA    0.104 0.101 0.059 
    (0.097) (0.100) (0.080) 
Loss    0.017 0.017  
    (0.011) (0.011)  
InvTurn    0.002 0.002  




AcqIntang    -0.019 -0.018 -0.030 
    (0.029) (0.030) (0.026) 
RD_SGA    0.00001 0.0002  
    (0.003) (0.004)  
log(Mcap)    -0.030** -0.031** -0.030** 
    (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) 
DivPayout    0.0003 0.0003  
    (0.0002) (0.0002)  
MktShare     0.035  
     (0.388)  
Inst_Owners     -0.0001 -0.0001 
     (0.0001) (0.0001) 
ESG_Sustainalytics:Crisis -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ESG_Sustainalytics:Rebound -0.00002 -0.0001 -0.00004 -0.00003 -0.00003 -0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Time Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 3,826 3,847 3,847 3,847 3,847 3,847 
Adjusted R2 -0.039 -0.040 0.055 0.067 0.067 0.065 




Table A.13: The effect of being ESG-rated during the rebound period 
Table A.13 presents the results from the regressions of BHAR on the independent variables. 
The ESG Dummy is set to 1 if the firm has a Refinitiv ESG score. Column (1) is estimated 
using all variables on the crisis period and (2) using a restricted model on the crisis. Columns 
(3) and (4) run the full- and restricted model on the rebound period. 
 
 
 Dependent variable: 
 BHAR 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
ESG_Dummy -0.003 0.004 0.109** 0.086** 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.052) (0.035) 
Mkt_RF_Loading 0.137*** 0.125*** -0.120** -0.138*** 
 (0.030) (0.011) (0.055) (0.034) 
HML_Loading -0.003  -0.003  
 (0.015)  (0.027)  
WML_Loading 0.034  0.044  
 (0.050)  (0.086)  
SMB_Loading 0.077  -0.132  
 (0.100)  (0.157)  
BTM 0.015  -0.067** -0.056** 
 (0.015)  (0.030) (0.027) 
BTMneg 0.128*  0.090  
 (0.071)  (0.147)  
Momentum -0.005  0.036  
 (0.015)  (0.031)  
Idiosyncratic -0.232  0.350  
 (0.550)  (0.887)  
Cash 0.009  0.195 0.267** 
 (0.057)  (0.134) (0.116) 
LTDebt -0.023  -0.211  
 (0.060)  (0.133)  
STDebt -0.087  -0.231  
 (0.098)  (0.204)  
ROA 0.106*** 0.094*** -0.061  
 (0.040) (0.027) (0.106)  
Loss -0.015  -0.022  
 (0.022)  (0.050)  
InvTurn 0.004  -0.017  
 (0.004)  (0.011)  
AcqIntang -0.021  0.264*** 0.251*** 
 (0.041)  (0.087) (0.086) 
RD_SGA 0.046* 0.045** 0.031 0.058 
 (0.024) (0.018) (0.083) (0.064) 
log(Mcap) 0.006  -0.011  
 (0.007)  (0.014)  
DivPayout 0.0003  -0.00003  




MktShare -0.019  0.091  
 (0.068)  (0.122)  
Inst_Owners 0.0001  -0.0002  
 (0.0004)  (0.001)  
Constant -0.310 -0.284** 0.001 -0.136 
 (0.892) (0.135) (0.439) (0.487) 
Industry Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 721 721 720 720 
Adjusted R2 0.240 0.240 0.122 0.129 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A.14: The probaility of beeing ESG-rated 
Table A.14 presents a linear probability model for the probability of being ESG-rated. ESG 
Dummy is regressed on all independent variables. 
 
 















































Industry Fixed Effects Yes 
Country Fixed Effects Yes 
Observations 720 
Adjusted R2 0.525 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
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Table A.15: GVIF tests 
 
For the continuous variables, the GVIF test produces the same values as the standard VIF test. 
For the factor variables GVIF^(1/(2*Df)) must be squared to get a value that can be interpreted 




GVIF test for the Refinitiv sample during crisis period: 
 
 GVIF GVIF^(1/(2*Df)) 
ESG 2.7204515 1.6493791 
Mkt_RF_Loading 7.6603293 2.7677300 
HML_Loading 8.9752576 2.9958734 
WML_Loading 4.4472918 2.1088603 
BTM 2.9714484 1.7237890 
BTMneg 2.2874221 1.5124226 
Momentum 1.8270348 1.3516785 
Idiosyncratic 6.4184932 2.5334745 
Cash 4.0325816 2.0081289 
LTDebt 2.9153557 1.7074413 
STDebt 1.8698038 1.3674077 
ROA 3.5994217 1.8972142 
Loss 2.3643343 1.5376392 
InvTurn 1.5579005 1.2481588 
AcqIntang 2.3091674 1.5195945 
RD_SGA 2.1366892 1.4617418 
log(Mcap) 3.3190283 1.8218200 
DivPayout 1.4787408 1.2160349 
Inst_Owners 1.8063992 1.3440235 
factor(SIC) 978.4937345 1.0948370 
factor(Country_Dummy) 6.4137361 1.3630711 
 
GVIF test for the Sustainalytics sample during crisis period: 
 
 GVIF GVIF^(1/(2*Df)) 
ESG_Sustainalytics 6.2964668 2.5092762 
Mkt_RF_Loading 2.9328197 1.7125477 
Momentum 3.5190843 1.8759223 
Cash 2.5931140 1.6103149 
LTDebt 5.4098364 2.3259055 
STDebt 3.3382340 1.8270835 
ROA 7.2613467 2.6946886 
Loss 3.7206000 1.9288857 
AcqIntang 3.5630060 1.8875926 
RD_SGA 3.6622248 1.9136940 
log(Mcap) 5.6189303 2.3704283 
DivPayout 2.2130013 1.4876160 
Inst_Owners 2.5815988 1.6067354 
factor(SIC) 41734.6710679 1.2270315 




Table A.16: Predicted R-squared 
R-squares for the full model on the Refinitiv sample during the crisis period: 
 
R-squares for the restricted model on the Refinitiv sample during the crisis period: 
 
R-squares for the full model on Sustainalytics sample during the crisis period: 
 
  






R-squared Adjusted R-squared Predicted R-squared 
0.6806208 0.5323985 0.31573592 
R-squared Adjusted R-squared Predicted R-squared 
0.6511385 0.5299363 0.3498214 
R-squared Adjusted R-squared Predicted R-squared 
0.8477054 0.6336594 0.253099 
R-squared Adjusted R-squared Predicted R-squared 
0.8182137 0.6479255 0.37167 
